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Abstract 
 
We find a positive association between disproportionate insider control and patent 
output, quality, creativity, and the efficient use of R&D in innovation. Managers of firms 
characterized by disproportionate control also take more personal innovative risk by filing 
their own patents. By controlling for standard entrenchment measures, we also find that 
insider entrenchment due to superior voting rights is distinct from entrenchment derived 
from standard antitakeover measures. Disproportionate insider control fosters innovation 
more than other forms of entrenchment. Positive effects are confined, however, to financially 
constrained firms and dissipate within ten years following the IPO. Dual class firms with 
financial constraints prefer to issue debt and are more likely to issue debt after 
collateralizing their patent portfolio.  Our results, which control for self-selection bias by 
using a sample of dual and single class firms matched on their innovativeness pre-IPO, 
therefore support the recent call for sunset provisions on dual class shares. 
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1 Introduction 
Dual class equity structures that enable corporate insiders to assert influence in the 
corporation disproportionate to that of outside shareholders have increased considerably in 
the U.S capital market in recent years.1 While only a mere 1% of firms conducting their 
IPOs in 2005 went public with a dual class equity structure, the proportion of such firms 
increased to 15% in 2014 and 24% in 2015. Among technology, media, and 
telecommunications companies going public in 2015, a staggering 56% chose a dual class 
structure (Feldman (2016)). 
This surge in the number of publicly traded firms that enable disproportionate 
insider control has triggered extensive discussions within the investment community.2 Dual 
class share structures are controversial (Howell (2014)). One perspective, the agency cost 
view, emphasizes that disproportionate insider control has the potential to enable the 
expropriation of private benefits of control by insiders at the expense of outside 
shareholders. The entrenching properties of dual class share structures also insulate 
underperforming management from shareholder accountability and the market for corporate 
control. In July 2017, favoring this view and following an initiative led by the shareholder 
advocacy group Council of Institutional Investors, index firms FTSE Russell, MSCI Inc., 
and Standard & Poors all adopted restrictions on the inclusion of dual class firms in their 
benchmark indices.  
 
1 Overall, dual class firms comprised about 6% of all U.S. public firms in the 1995-2002 period (Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2010)), but now account for 8.7% of companies included in the Russell 3000 index (Equilar, 
2015, The Stock Structure Debate, Available at http://www.equilar.com/blogs/13-stock-structure-ipos.html). 
2 See, for example, “Out of Control,” The Economist, September 22, 2014, available at 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21618889-more-worlds-big-stockmarkets-are-
allowing-firms-alibaba-sideline; “Why Investors Are Fretting Over Dual-Class Shares,” Bloomberg 
Businessweek, July 9, 2017, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/why-
investors-are-fretting-over-dual-class-shares-quicktake-q-a. 
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By contrast, the innovation view argues that dual class structures allow companies 
to focus on long-term strategy, to reduce managerial myopia, and to better resist short-term 
expectations that often come with being publicly traded. In fact, the seminal paper on dual 
class firms by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) argues that dual class equity structures 
represent a beneficial hybrid between public and private ownership, which allows firms to 
maintain the benefits of private companies, such as autonomy and a tolerance for innovative 
failure, while also allowing access to equity financing needed by companies facing financial 
constraints. In keeping with this perspective, NASDAQ in its report “The Promise of 
Market Reform: Reigniting America's Economic Engine” (2017) expresses the opinion:  
“One of America’s greatest strengths is that we are a magnet for 
entrepreneurship and innovation. Central to cultivating this strength is 
establishing multiple paths entrepreneurs can take to public markets. Each 
publicly traded company should have flexibility to determine a class structure 
that is most appropriate and beneficial for them, so long as this structure is 
transparent and disclosed up-front so that investors have complete visibility 
into the company. Dual class structures allow investors to invest side-by-side 
with innovators and high-growth companies, enjoying the financial benefits 
of these companies’ success.” 
While many studies have examined the agency cost view of dual class firms (Adams and 
Ferreira (2008); Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010)), the 
innovation view has seen little empirical evaluation and has not been satisfactorily addressed 
(Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017)).  
We address this empirical scarcity by utilizing a comprehensive, hand-collected 
sample of U.S. dual class firms, which approaches the population of all publicly traded dual 
class companies in the U.S. Using this sample, we are the first study we are aware of to 
examine the effects of dual class share structures on the outputs of firm innovative efforts. 
Examining the outputs of innovation provides a more complete and relevant picture of a 
firm’s innovativeness than simply looking at innovative inputs, which may or may not result 
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in successful outcomes. Importantly, examining the outputs of innovation also mitigates 
significant endogeneity concerns inherent to the most frequently used proxy for innovation, 
R&D spending, which is fully under managerial control (Atanassov (2013)).3 
One major empirical concern in any study examining the consequences of corporate 
governance arrangements is endogeneity; specifically, the endogeneity of ownership 
structure. The specifics of a firm’s equity structure, including the rights and privileges of 
owners, are typically determined in conjunction with the firm’s IPO. However, the same 
insiders that influence a firm’s decision to go public with a dual class structure of equity 
also possess significant private information about the firm’s innovation strategy and other 
objectives (and control the firms’ R&D expenditures). Therefore, it is difficult to empirically 
disentangle whether dual class firms are more innovative or whether innovative firms are 
more likely to choose a dual class structure.  
While a perfect solution to endogeneity may not exist, we attempt to mitigate these 
endogeneity concerns in four related ways. First, to address the possibility that innovative 
firms are more likely to adopt a dual class structure, we base our primary analyses on a 
propensity score matched sample of dual class and single class firms where we match firms 
not only on variables demonstrated to affect the choice of a dual class structure at IPO 
from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010), but also on firms’ prior or ongoing innovation at 
the time of the IPO (“patent pipeline”). In doing so, we ensure that single and dual class 
firms included in our sample are equally innovative at the time of their public offering. 
Second, we control for sample selection bias using a Heckman two-stage estimation approach 
(Heckman (1979)). Third, we perform within sample tests using our sample of only dual 
class firms because any association between disproportionate ownership and innovativeness 
 
3 For robustness, we include R&D spending as a control in all of our models; the results hold both with and 
without including R&D, and also when including lagged R&D. 
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we find among dual class firms only cannot be due to systematic differences between dual 
and single class firms. Fourth and finally, we additionally incorporate controls for the extent 
of antitakeover protection and competition to further address remaining concerns of an 
omitted variable bias affecting our results.  
Overall, we find a positive association between disproportionate insider control and 
the number and quality of firms’ innovative outputs and exploratory research.  This positive 
association is not driven by higher investment in R&D spending, which is not significantly 
related to dual class share structure.  To gain further insights into this positive association, 
we examine four additional key conjectures on the association of disproportionate insider 
control and innovativeness. First, we divide our sample into equal sized quantiles of 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Financially constrained firms face pressure 
to underinvest in innovation if they are unsure of their ability to secure additional financing 
and keep investment in R&D and researcher salaries steady.4  Dual class managers, with 
their ability to focus on long-term growth over short term goals (Jordan, Kim, and Liu 
(2016)), can more easily shrug off short term earnings pressure and maintain their 
innovative investments.  Indeed, we find that the overall positive effect of dual class share 
structure on innovation is driven primarily by financially constrained firms. Financially 
constrained firms without sufficient internal cash flow to continue innovation also have the 
choice to access either the equity market or debt market for capital.  However, issuing 
additional equity dilutes existing owners control and increases the threat of takeover, 
whereas access to the debt market can be limited for innovative firms (Brown, Fazzari, and 
Petersen (2009); Geelen, Hajda, and Morellec (2019)).  Consistent with Dey, Nikolaev, and 
Wang (2016),  we find that dual class managers are more likely to access the debt market 
 
4 Salary reductions could induce the departure of key researchers with significant organization capital (Eisfeldt 
and Papanikolaou (2013)).  
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when facing financial constraints, particularly when they have previously used patents as 
collateral for debt (Mann (2018)).   
Second, we examine a time-trend to determine whether the positive association 
between disproportionate insider control and innovative outputs is constant or whether it 
decreases or increases with time. Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) document major 
changes in firm ownership structure in the first few years after an IPO that could affect 
firm innovation, especially in light of a possible enhanced role of key executives in the 
innovative process of dual class firms. In addition, Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi (2015) find 
that takeover defenses enhance value in firms post-IPO, but that they become costly with 
time.5 Closely related to this finding, Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste (2018) find that 
dual class firms have a higher valuation post-IPO than single class firms, but that the 
premium dissipates and becomes a discount about six years after the IPO. In our trend 
analysis, we similarly find that the superior innovativeness of dual class firms decreases over 
time: the positive association between disproportionate insider control and innovativeness, 
as well as the mitigating effect of innovation on firm value, is limited only to the first ten 
years post-IPO with negligible benefits thereafter. Diminishing innovativeness may therefore 
offer one explanation for the short-lived valuation premium for dual class firms post-IPO 
observed in Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste (2018). 
Third, we examine the role of key executives on the overall positive association of 
disproportionate insider control and innovativeness. We find that in firms characterized by 
disproportionate inside control, the firms’ top executives, i.e., the CEO, Chairman, and/or 
 
5 This mirrors a recent article noting that the Harvard Law School Shareholder Rights Project has succeeded 
in pressuring 1/3 of Fortune 500 firms to eliminate their staggered boards, but that IPOs are actually 
increasing their staggered board adoptions. The article suggests that this is possibly being done to shield 
directors from shareholder pressure, so they can focus on long-term decisions that may be more important for 
younger firms. The New York Times “The case against staggered boards”. March 20, 2012. 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-case-against-staggered-boards/.  
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President, are more likely to file their own patents. Part of the increase in innovativeness 
is therefore directly attributable to the insiders of the firm that hold disproportionate 
control rights. Dual class structures hence appear to create conditions for entrepreneurial 
executives to maximize their “private benefits of entrepreneurial control” such as 
independence and reputation (Aghion and Bolton (1992); Sauermann and Cohen (2010)) 
that enable the pursuit of a personal innovation strategy even in a public company setting, 
with benefits for the company as a whole. Furthermore, we control for several CEO 
characteristics and find robust results.  
Finally, studies have often used dual class firms to examine consequences of 
managerial entrenchment and antitakeover protection (Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009)). In 
the innovation literature, the effect of managerial entrenchment due to antitakeover 
provisions on innovation is mixed. Some studies find antitakeover protection improves 
innovation (Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014); Chemmanur and Tian (2018)), 
but other studies show no effect of enhanced managerial entrenchment on innovation 
(Atanassov (2013); Chen (2012); O’Connor and Rafferty (2012); Faleye (2009)). 
Chemmanur, Gupta, and Simonyan (2018) demonstrate that pre-IPO innovation increases 
the antitakeover protection chosen at IPO.  Dual class firms are virtually immune from 
hostile takeovers, due to the fact that any takeover must be approved by the majority of 
shareholders of each class of shares. This begs the question if our finding, a positive impact 
of disproportionate insider control on innovation, is simply due to a general positive effect 
of antitakeover protection on innovation, or if there is something unique about dual class 
status as a specific and distinct type of antitakeover strategy.  
While antitakeover devices such as staggered boards or poison pills make it more 
difficult for any outside shareholder to gain majority control, dual class firms are immune 
from takeover specifically for the exact opposite reason: certain individuals already have 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516869
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majority control of the voting rights. While the result – the firm is protected from hostile 
takeovers – is the same, both are distinct mechanisms: one makes concentrated ownership 
very difficult and the other embraces it.  Prior studies have even shown that the controlling 
block in dual class firms can provide beneficial and stable monitoring of non-block CEOs 
(Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003)). In extended analysis, we therefore compare dual class 
firms to a sample of only high antitakeover protection single class firms and find that our 
results are persistent.6 We conclude that it is not just the simple antitakeover protection 
that comes with disproportionate insider control that positively influences firms’ innovative 
output, but that the specific form of antitakeover protection due to the empowerment of 
specific individuals is a relevant factor in promoting innovation. 
Taken together, our findings contribute meaningfully to the ongoing debate 
surrounding the appropriateness of dual class structures. We establish that disproportionate 
insider control indeed enhances firms’ innovative output. However, this benefit accrues 
primarily to financially constrained firms, i.e., firms who depend on the access to public 
capital markets to further their innovative strategy. We also find evidence for an enhanced 
role of key executives in the innovation process of dual class firms. The declining 
innovativeness over time is consistent with the important role of specific key personnel for 
the innovativeness of dual class firms, whose impact diminishes as their incentives and 
involvement changes post-IPO. Our findings lend credence to the recent call from 
shareholder advocacy groups that if dual class structures should be allowed at all, they 
should face rigorous sunset provisions and be eliminated in a certain period post-IPO 
(Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017); Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste (2018)).  
 
6 In all of our analysis in the paper, we control in our selection model for pre-IPO innovativeness as well as 
exclude the year of the IPO and the following year to ensure that pre-IPO innovation selection effects are not 
the main driver of our results.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the development of 
our hypotheses and expands our literature review. Section 3 describes the data and the 
measures used in our analyses. Section 4 presents the methodology and the results. Section 
5 concludes. 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Prior empirical evidence on the association between disproportionate insider control 
and innovation is very limited (Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017)) and has produced mixed 
results. While Jordan, Kim, and Liu (2016) find that a dual class structure helps to promote 
risk-taking and R&D spending in growth stocks, Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2010) 
find that dual class firms do not increase R&D spending after an IPO. Instead, they find 
that these firms go public simply to diversify insider holdings, which is also supported by 
Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) in the case of both single and dual class firms. Both of 
these studies focus on R&D spending. However, R&D spending is an incomplete measure of 
innovation because it must be combined with factors such as human capital, effort, and 
creativity to result in successful outputs of innovation (Atanassov (2013)). In addition, 
R&D spending, which is fully under managerial control, is jointly determined with any other 
corporate decision and therefore subject to significant endogeneity concerns. Our paper thus 
contributes to this stream of literature by focusing on a richer proxy for innovativeness, 
innovative outputs, while also by design avoiding some of the difficult to disentangle 
endogeneity concerns in prior work.  
2.1 Dual Class Effect on Innovation and its Distinction from Other 
Antitakeover Measures 
Dual class firms typically provide corporate insiders with voting power in excess of 
their economic interest in the firm. Consequently, dual class firms may be viewed as a 
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hybrid organizational form which fits between the widely dispersed-ownership of a public 
corporation and the closely-held (private) firm (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985)). The 
continuing dominant role of specific insiders, the holders of the superior voting shares, 
distinguishes dual class equity structures from other entrenching corporate governance 
provisions. Antitakeover measures, such as poison pills or staggered boards, for instance, 
also provide protection of insiders from the market for corporate control, but do not 
empower any specific person or group over other owners through disproportionate control 
rights. For example, in firms protected by poison pills (one of the most potent of all 
antitakeover devices) no individual can acquire more than a threshold ownership of, 
typically, 20% of the vote. In our dual class firm sample, by contrast, we find that insiders 
control 62% of the vote at the median. Both are effective antitakeover devices, but in one 
case, it is because gaining majority control is impossible; in the other, because it already 
exists. Thus, distinct from “general” antitakeover measures, which protect whoever happens 
to be at the helm, dual class structures uniquely empower specific insiders to pursue a 
personal agenda of greater investments in long-term projects with uncertain future payoffs 
(while also providing effective antitakeover protection). On that point, Burkart and Lee 
(2008) argue that a dual class structure actually provides effective monitoring by the 
dominant share class blockholders of a CEO outside of that group, citing Anderson, Mansi, 
and Reeb (2003). They also note that a dual class structure provides other benefits to the 
firm, such as reducing the free rider problem in corporate takeovers (even in cases of 
asymmetric information, which inherently exists in firms with long term project 
uncertainty).  In addition, Dey, Nikolaev, and Wang (2016) note that dual class structures 
provide unique benefits in highly competitive environments where changing strategies in a 
timely manner is especially beneficial. 
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Prior papers examining the effect of antitakeover devices on innovation have 
produced mixed results (Adams and Ferreira (2008)). For example, the entrenchment effects 
of antitakeover might improve innovation under the career concerns hypothesis but deter 
innovation under the quiet life hypothesis (Bernstein (2015)).  Indeed, one strand of recent 
literature finds that antitakeover protection either has no effect on or actually reduces 
innovation (Atanassov (2013); Chen (2012); O’Connor and Rafferty (2012); Faleye (2009)). 
On the other hand, another strand of recent literature finds that antitakeover devices do 
improve innovation (Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014); Chemmanur and Tian 
(2018)). However, these latter papers tend to focus on antitakeover devices from Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) that limit their samples to larger firms. In addition, even this 
latter literature disagrees on the quality of the innovations produced by antitakeover 
protection in publicly traded firms. If a firm goes public while still hoping to pursue 
beneficial innovations, Manso (2011) theorizes that these firms must implement mechanisms 
in addition to managerial entrenchment to properly motivate innovation.  
This debate in the literature may indicate that antitakeover measures alone may 
represent an insufficient condition for long-term value creation via innovation. While 
antitakeover measures inherently protect managers from a hostile outside acquisition, they 
often fail to protect managers from a hostile board. Hostile boards were less of a threat in 
the late 20th century due to 1) recent increases in activist shareholders demanding board 
changes and 2) requirements stipulating a higher proportion of independent board members. 
Indeed, simultaneous with the recent rise in dual class IPOs, there has been a sharp increase 
in the number of activist shareholders seeking to gain board control to replace bad managers 
and to curtail R&D spending (Coffee, Jr. and Palia (2016)). Bushee (1998) finds that certain 
types of institutional owners (acting as activists) inhibit innovation and risk taking by 
focusing on short term improvements in earnings and firm performance, representing a 
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constant threat to long-term planning. These institutions will often seek representation on 
the board to pressure management for change.  
Also simultaneous with the recent increases in activist shareholders and dual class 
IPOs, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 requires firms to enhance outside board 
representation. This has likely helped fuel the rise in activist shareholders attempting to 
gain board seats to replace management (Guo, Kruse, and Nohel (2008); Denes, Karpoff, 
and McWilliams (2017)) and thus further weakening stand-alone antitakeover devices. 
While outside board members have generally been considered beneficial for firm 
performance, there is significant empirical literature suggesting that outside board members 
may not be beneficial for innovation (Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011); Balsmeier, 
Fleming, and Manso (2017)). However, Sarbanes Oxley exempts dual class companies from 
the requirement to add additional outside board members because they are “controlled 
firms,” providing dual class firms a key protection against hostile bids for corporate control.  
In addition to the antitakeover protection provided by the share structure, dual class 
companies also have lower proportions of institutional investors (Jordan, Kim, and Liu 
(2016)) and less independent boards (Baran and Forst (2015)).  
Thus, three possible forces that can arguably contribute to managerial myopia and 
discourage a long-term orientation are greatly reduced in dual class firms. Given these 
advantages, disproportionate insider control, which uniquely combines private control in a 
publicly traded firm, may theoretically be well suited to boost firm insiders’ ability to 
innovate. Specifically, in their theoretical paper, Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2014) suggest 
public firms are less likely to engage in product market innovation than private firms and 
that private firms produce higher quality explorative7 patents; conjectures for which 
empirical support is provided in Bernstein (2015) who finds that public firms have lower 
 
7 March (1991) provides further context to the differences between explorative and exploitative research. 
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innovation quality and more exploitative patents than private firms due to managerial 
career concerns. In a related vein, another theoretical paper by Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) 
suggests that dual class public firms may be able to produce higher quality innovations than 
single class public firms. Taken together, this group of papers suggest that disproportionate 
insider control might engender “the best of both worlds” by allowing insiders to maintain 
some of the benefits of private control, i.e., reduced short-term pressure and therefore 
increased tolerance for failure, while also allowing access to more extensive equity markets. 
Consequently, we form our first two hypothesis:  
H1: Disproportionate insider control is positively associated with innovation output, 
quality, and creativity measured by patents, citations, and explorative patents. 
2.2 Dual Class Structure and Innovation in Financially Constrained Firms 
Innovative firms in high growth industries can face serious challenges to their success 
and survival due to financial constraints.  These firms must invest heavily to grow quickly 
enough to stay technologically competitive, yet these firms encounter major difficulties in 
raising funding due to the long term, uncertain nature of their projects and the information 
asymmetries inherent to new technologies.  Also this funding must be rather steady because 
researcher salaries comprise a significant portion of R&D funding (Goolsbee (1998)).  
Researchers represent significant organization capital that is risky since they can leave the 
firm with their knowhow at any time (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013)). For this reason, 
firms value the ability to maintain R&D funding at constant levels even when facing adverse 
financial conditions to prevent key employees from leaving the firm due to a pay cut (Hall 
and Lerner (2010); Brown and Petersen (2011)). The uncertain cash flows inherent to 
innovative firms can make it more difficult for these firms to secure financing and keep 
R&D at constant levels or to adjust compensation upward, if necessary, to retain these 
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valuable employees. In fact, the risk of not being able to maintain financing may lead 
managers to underinvest in innovative projects for fear of losing their investment (Becker 
(1964); DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985)). 
Given the potential for underinvestment due to financial constraints, Acharya and 
Xu (2017) argue that going public is especially beneficial for firms in innovative industries 
that are also dependent on external financing. Going public offers the greatest source of 
funds possible for these companies, but also incurs the risk that incumbent managers will 
lose control to outside investors.  A loss of control to outsiders during a period of uncertainty 
may force public firm management to again underinvest and forego some value enhancing 
projects.  In fact, Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2014) and Bernstein (2015) find private firms, 
despite lacking the access to public capital markets, to be more innovative than publicly 
traded firms in part because they can avoid this expropriation risk.  DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1985) address this conflict and suggest that a dual class structure allows financially 
constrained private firms to go public to obtain equity financing for their long-term 
investments, while simultaneously preventing the expropriation of returns from their 
investments by outside shareholders.8  Innovative founders and managers in particular can 
benefit from dual class structures, as they risk the expropriation of their own individual 
research stream (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985)).  The tolerance for failure (Manso (2011)) 
afforded to innovative managers with a dual class structure should lead to more and better 
innovations.   
However, while the IPO provides an initial source of equity financing for innovative 
firms, the long term and uncertain nature of innovation can require additional infusions of 
 
8 They note “in a public corporation, vote ownership can shield incumbent managers from competition effected 
through vote accumulation by other management teams. Vote ownership can thus encourage managers to 
invest in organization-specific capital whose returns are potentially appropriable if outside stockholders can 
transfer control to another management group.” 
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capital.  The traditional view has held that young innovative firms (which commonly face 
additional capital needs) must either use their own internal cash reserves or issue additional 
equity to gain extra financing (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009); Brown and Petersen 
(2011); Geelen, Hajda, and Morellec (2019)).  Debt financing has traditionally been 
considered a less viable option for innovative firms due to 1) their uncertain and volatile 
cash flows creating the potential for further financial distress affecting the debt payments, 
2) asymmetric information causing adverse selection risks for the lender, and 3) the lack of 
collateral value for intangible assets (Berger and Udell (1990); Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen 
(2009)).   
To an extent this is less of a problem for dual class firms, who have a greater ability 
to issue additional equity.  Due to insiders typically holding shares with superior voting 
rights, they can issue equity with very little loss of voting control and avoid the concern of 
underinvestment.  However, even with the ability to issue equity while maintaining control, 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) observe higher leverage in dual class firms and Dey, 
Nikolaev, and Wang (2016) find a higher probability to issue debt among dual class firms 
that need to access the capital market.  Dual class companies may prefer to issue debt over 
equity for multiple reasons.  First and foremost, owners of the superior voting shares will 
likely not want to dilute their voting power below the level needed to maintain control.  
Second, although they could dilute only the low vote class of shareholders by issuing equity 
within their class (Bauguess, Slovin, and Sushka (2012)), they may not choose to do so for 
multiple reasons.  For example, lower voting class shareholders have filed litigation for 
managerial breach of fiduciary duties when they felt they could successfully argue that the 
move lowered the value of their class of stock relative to the high vote class.9 Additionally, 
 
9 Many cases have appeared reflecting this breach of fiduciary duty argument.  For example, in 2012 Google 
attempted to issue a third class of no voting right shares.  Shareholders filed suit for breach of fiduciary duty, 
and ultimately Google was forced to pay $560 million for the value of the lost voting rights – “Dual Class: 
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a few exchanges make it difficult to dilute the lower class of shares.10  Even barring litigation 
or exchange restrictions, firms may simply face low demand when attempting to issue low 
voting rights shares11 due to the agency costs involved and low voting right class investors’ 
own risk of expropriation.   
Given the barriers to the use of debt in innovative firms discussed above, why might 
dual class firms still prefer to issue debt to alleviate financial constraints? First, Dey, 
Nikolaev, and Wang (2016) introduce a bonding hypothesis arguing that monitoring by 
debtholders reduces the agency conflict between the superior and inferior classes of equity 
holders.  By issuing debt, insiders demonstrate they are willing to curb the private benefits 
of control established by the dual class structure.  Second, Mann (2018) shows that debt 
financing increases when patents can be pledged as collateral for the financing of innovation. 
In fact, Mann (2018) finds that 16% of patents produced by U.S. corporations have been 
pledged as collateral in the past.  Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, dual class firms 
planning to issue debt may wish to reduce information asymmetries with lenders and other 
stakeholders and use the value of their patent rights as collateral to secure debt.  Taking 
these ideas together, we examine whether financially constrained dual class firms are more 
likely to produce better innovations and utilize debt financing aided in part by collateralized 
 
The Consequences of Depriving Institutional Investors of Corporate Voting Rights” found at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/dual-class-the-consequences-of-depriving-institutional-
investors-of-corporate-voting-rights/. 
10 For example, the AMEX issued a policy statement in 1976 forbidding the dilution of the limited voting 
shareholders stake; in 1991 they amended this policy to allow dilution to occur only if two-thirds of total 
shareholders or a majority of low vote class shareholders approved the plan (Ashton (1994)). 
11 “A potential explanation for dual-class firms’ heavier reliance on debt financing is that investors may be 
reluctant to purchase the inferior voting stock of these firms, and they may therefore have to rely more heavily 
on debt financing…The most plausible explanation is that some firms adopt dual-class structures when their 
original owners are reluctant to cede control; later, these firms are less likely to tap capital markets (so as to 
avoid diluting control) and thus invest less, grow slower, and are valued lower” – Andrew Metrick, “The 
effects of dual-class ownership on ordinary shareholders”, June 30th, 2004, Knowledge@Wharton in reference 
to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010). 
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patents.  Indeed, Dey, Nikolaev, and Wang (2016) show that dual class firms with high 
growth opportunities have both higher leverage and more frequent equity issuances.  The 
potential to issue higher amounts of both equity and debt financing in innovative dual class 
firms, in tandem with the innovative benefits provided by the concentrated control of dual 
class, should lead to more and higher quality patents in financially constrained dual class 
firms.  Thus we hypothesize:  
H2A: The positive relationship between disproportionate insider control and 
innovative activity is stronger for financially constrained firms.  
H2B: Innovative dual class firms issue more debt and equity. 
H2C: The use of patents as collateral increases the likelihood of financially 
constrained firms using debt financing. 
2.3 Age of Dual Class Firms post-IPO and Innovation 
Previous work finds that innovation varies inversely with firm age (Huergo and 
Jaumandreu (2004); Balasubramanian and Lee (2008)). Also, Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi 
(2015) find that takeover defenses enhance value in firms’ post-IPO, but that they become 
costly as a firm matures and ownership becomes more dispersed (Helwege, Pirinsky, and 
Stulz (2007)). Because the original founders’ incentives change following the IPO, and 
because management turnover is inevitable over time, the innovative management that 
originally initiated the dual class share structure will not be with the firm in the future. 
Thus, the ability for innovation to mitigate the relationship between disproportionate 
insider control and firm value may not be constant over time. The investment community 
and recent congressional actions also appear to recognize that young public firms are special. 
For instance, the recently proposed “Fostering Innovation Act” (2017) would create an 
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exemption from certain requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for small newly public firms 
for the first five years past their IPO.12 In addition, in July 2016 a consortium of prominent 
chief executives and investment managers recommended:  
“Dual class voting is not a best practice. If a company has dual class voting, 
which sometimes is intended to protect the company from short-term 
behavior, the company should consider having specific sunset provisions based 
upon time or a triggering event, which eliminate dual class voting.”13 
 
Similarly, recent academic work suggests that it may be beneficial to institute phaseout 
requirements which would limit dual class share structures to only a specific time period 
following the firm’s IPO (Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017); Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste 
(2018)). We therefore hypothesize: 
H3: The innovative advantages created by disproportionate insider control decline 
post-IPO.  
2.4 Dual Class Status and CEO Patenting 
The entrenchment effect of disproportionate insider control may also enable insiders 
to enjoy enhanced private benefits of control. Importantly, in the context of our study, 
entrepreneurial managers may therefore also seek to maximize personal intangibles through 
their “private benefits of entrepreneurial control” which can indirectly maximize long-term 
firm value (Aghion and Bolton (1992); Dessein (2005)). These intangibles can include 
reputation and human capital (Aghion and Bolton (1992)), autonomy (Sauermann and 
Cohen (2010)), and career concerns (Holmstrom (1999); Siemsen (2008)). A dual class share 
 
12 Summary and full text of the “Fostering Innovation Act” of 2017: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/1645.  
13 “A United Effort to Overhaul Corporate Governance” August 1, 2016, by Michael W. Peregrine. The New 
York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/business/dealbook/a-united-effort-to-overhaul-
corporate-governance.html. The list of principles is available here: http://www.governanceprinciples.org/.  
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structure reduces many of the external pressures that affect management in single class 
firms for at least three reasons. First, dual class firms typically have less independent boards 
(Baran and Forst (2015)) thus preventing unwanted advisory pressure that may discourage 
otherwise risk-seeking innovators. Second, pressure to replace managers from influential 
shareholders is reduced as institutional investors often avoid dual class firms because they 
cannot influence them (Wen (2013)). Third, the negative effect of analyst coverage, which 
often induces managerial myopia or short-term orientation, is largely mitigated in dual class 
firms (He and Tian (2013); Jordan, Kim, and Liu (2016)). These reductions in external 
pressures could encourage more innovation and personal risk taking by management in dual 
class firms.  
H4: Disproportionate insider control is positively associated with personal 
innovative activities by management.  
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We combine data from several different sources in the 2000-2008 sample period. We 
primarily obtain patent information from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) patent database, which consists of over three million patents and twenty-three 
million patent citations from 1976 to 2006. We then use the NBER bridge file to link over 
one million of these patents directly to Compustat firms by GVKEY. In addition, we also 
match patents to firms by PERMNO using the Kogan et al. (2017) patent database which 
enables us to extend our sample to 2008.14  
 
14 We begin our sample in 2000 because of limitations from our dual class database and conclude our sample 
in 2008 due to limitations on available patent data. Although the Kogan et al. (2017) sample extends to 2010 
by patent grant, our evaluation of patent filings limits our sample to 2008. 
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We compile our sample of dual class firms between 2000 and 2008 following the 
methods of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) and described in Baran and Forst (2015). 
From the list of potential dual class firms, we eliminate foreign and financial firms and 
manually verify the dual class status from the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
EDGAR database from proxy statement and/or 10-Ks. Following Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2010), we include as insider ownership any shares owned by officers and directors, 
family members of insiders, and trusts for the benefit of family members. We obtain firm 
financial information from Compustat and market data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP).  Finally, we use debt and equity issuance information from the 
Securities Data Company (SDC).   
3.1 Disproportionate Insider Control Measure 
Our measure of disproportionate insider control is WEDGE, defined as the difference 
between insider voting rights and insider cash flow rights (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2010)). Insider voting rights are measured as board election rights (Baran and Forst (2015)) 
which measure the proportion of all board seats controlled by insiders from both the number 
of votes per share of each class of stock as well as disproportionate board representation. 
Insider cash flow rights are measured by the percentage of shares of each class held by 
insiders weighted by the dividend rights per class. 
3.2 Firm-Level Innovation Measures 
We utilize two main measures of innovation: 1) The number of PATENTS which 
measures the amount of output and 2) Patent CITATIONS which measure the quality of 
innovative output.  While our main focus is on output measures of innovation, we also 
consider R&D spending as an input to innovation.  Previous results on R&D spending in 
dual class firms are mixed . Jordan, Kim, and Liu (2016) find that dual class firms have 
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higher R&D compared to single class firms.  Dey, Nikolaev, and Wang (2016), however, 
show R&D spending in their sample is higher for single class firms.  Both R&D spending 
and patent measures have shortcomings as measures of innovation.  Input measures such 
as R&D spending can be subject to simultaneity bias if shocks to R&D expenditures also 
affect the choice of management to adopt certain antitakeover devices (O’Connor and 
Rafferty (2012)).  More importantly, R&D spending must be combined with the successful 
use of other factors including human capital, effort, and creativity to result in innovation 
output (Atanassov (2013)).15  On the other hand, firms may be reluctant to file patents at 
all in order to protect trade secrets (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000); Klasa et al. (2018)) 
or they may file frivolous patents as a method of gaming to strategically prevent competitor 
entry into their markets (Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Jaffe and Lerner (2006)).  We consider 
the question of frivolous patents by excluding observations with extreme levels of citations, 
originality, and generality.  Originality measures the breadth of patent technology classes 
cited by the patent and generality measures the breadth of patent technology classes that 
later cite this patent.  We further classify patents as EXPLORATIVE or EXPLOITATIVE 
following Fitzgerald et al. (2019) and He et al. (2019) respectively.  EXPLORATIVE 
patents represent new areas of innovation with greater risk, whereas EXPLOITATIVE 
innovation continues to develop current areas of innovation.  Appendix A contains precise 
definitions of all variables.  
4 Methodology and Results 
4.1 Sample Selection Bias and Endogeneity Concerns 
 
15 Because multiple factors impact the eventual value of R&D, studies find conflicting evidence. For example, 
Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) find that firms experiencing an unexpected increase in R&D spending 
achieve higher future stock returns and operating performance. In contrast, Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 
(2001) find that R&D alone cannot explain valuation enhancement in a firm, as they find that the level of 
R&D spending has no effect on firm returns. 
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As in the majority of studies of corporate governance or ownership structure, we 
must control for sample selection bias and the joint determination problem of dual class 
structure and innovation. To control for factors known to affect the decision to adopt a 
dual class structure of shares at IPO, we follow the literature and create a propensity score 
matched sample of dual and single class firms based on the selection model in Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2010). Specifically, we estimate a probit regression that models the 
choice to adopt a dual class structure at the IPO as a function of proxies for the level of 
private benefits of control after the IPO.16  
Importantly, we supplement the set of variables from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2010) with two variables that capture the strength of firms’ existing innovation pipelines. 
Often firms go public when significant innovations have recently been achieved, or seem to 
be likely soon, creating an endogeneity problem (Bernstein (2015)), i.e., any positive 
association between disproportionate insider ownership and innovation may not be due to 
dual class structures fostering innovation, but simply due to innovative firms being more 
likely to choose dual class structures. Additionally, the choice to adopt antitakeover 
protection at IPO is influenced by innovation activity prior to the IPO (Chemmanur, 
Gupta, and Simonyan (2018)).  To combat this reverse causality problem, we additionally 
match firms on measures of their innovation inputs and outputs at the time of their IPO. 
Specifically, we include in the selection model the number of patents that were filed but not 
yet granted at the time of the IPO (Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014)) plus the 
number of patents filed within one year of the IPO since these patents are likely to be based 
on R&D in progress at the time of the IPO. In addition, we include R&D/Assets in the 
 
16 For brevity, we refer to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) for an explanation of the rationale of all variables 
included in the selection model. For instance, NAME represents an indicator variable reflecting if the name 
of the company includes the name of person. NAME provides a control for family firm status because family 
ownership is predictive of dual class status (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985)). 
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IPO year to capture the input measure of future patents at the time of the IPO.  Based on 
the findings in Chemmanur, Gupta, and Simonyan (2018), we also exclude from all analysis 
the first two years after the IPO to further mitigate the concern that our results are driven 
by the selection bias to a dual class share structure by innovative firms.17   
4.2 Controlling for Pre-IPO Innovation in Selection Model 
It is difficult to estimate innovation prior to an IPO, as most datasets covering 
publicly traded firms only report firm financials and insider profiles post-IPO. However, a 
unique aspect of the patent database of Kogan et al. (2017) and the NBER database is that 
they are matched to firms using patent grant date, not patent filing date. During our sample 
period, the average patent pendency was often over three years,18 meaning that the average 
patent granted even three years post-IPO was likely filed before the initial public offering. 
This provided us with a substantial proportion of patents that we can identify with a filing 
date before the IPO date. In addition, limiting our sample to post-2000 also gives us several 
advantages in terms of identifying pre-IPO innovation. First, the American Inventors 
Protection Act of 1999 led to the mandatory publication of patent filed on or after November 
29, 2000 within 18 months of filing regardless of whether the patent had been granted,19 
allowing roughly half of the pending patents at the time of the IPO (based on the average 
pendency length at this time) to have their entire processes publicly available to outsiders. 
Second, the TRIPS agreement20 in 1994 (and further clarified in 1999) allowed provisional 
 
17 In our age subsample tests, we further exclude years 0-3 post IPO to alleviate concerns about reverse 
causality.  
18 https://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004.  
19 “USPTO will begin publishing patent applications” Brigid Quinn, Maria V. Hernandez. November 27, 2000. 
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-will-begin-publishing-patent-applications.  
20 Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property rightS (TRIPS) agreement of 1994, as part of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). https://ladas.com/education-center/a-brief-history-of-the-patent-
law-of-the-united-states-2/.  
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patents to be quickly filed, thus allowing the use of the term “patent pending” to be used 
for marketing purposes and to allow licensing and distribution of new products. Importantly, 
this also enabled firms with recently developed innovations to fully reveal their information 
in road shows before the IPO. Given the availability of pre-IPO patent data and these 
regulatory changes, we control for the patent pipeline in our selection model to address the 
concerns of reverse causality.  
We utilize the following selection model, which incorporates 1) the “patent pipeline” 
measures of innovation proxied by pre-IPO patent filings and pre-IPO R&D spending and 
2) the matching variables in the selection model of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010). 
 Pr(DC) = β0 + β1NUMBERPATENTSi + β2R&DatIPOi + β3NAMEi  + β4MEDIAi + β5SALESRANKi + β6PROFITRANKi  + β7%FIRMSi + β8%SALESi + β9SALES/REGIONSALESi + β10STATEANTI + βkLISTINGYEARi  + βjINDUSTRYi + ε 
(1) 
The dependent variable DC is equal to one for firms with a dual class structure and zero 
otherwise. We present the results of the selection model in Table 1. For our patent pipeline 
measures, we find that the number of patents in the pipeline at IPO is only a marginally 
significant predictor of dual class status after controlling for all other factors from Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2010).  
We create a propensity-score matched sample of dual and single class firms using 
Model (1) similar to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010), McGuire, Wang, and Wilson 
(2014), Baran and Forst (2015), and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009). Specifically, using 
Model (1), we estimate the probability that a firm will adopt a dual class structure on an 
annual basis. We then match a single class and dual class observation without replacement 
on the closest estimated probability of choosing a dual class structure. This process creates 
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a matched sample of firms with similar characteristics, including a similar patent pipeline, 
with the exception that one has elected a dual class equity structure while the other has 
not. In this fashion, the concern that our results are affected by differences in the observable 
firm characteristics matched upon is mitigated (McGuire, Wang, and Wilson (2014)). We 
also use Model (1) to implement a two-stage methodology (Heckman (1979)) to control for 
sample selection bias in our dual class only sample and include the inverse Mills ratio derived 
from the estimation of Model (1) as an additional control in our tests that utilize only our 
sample of dual class firms.  In our full sample, we have a mix of innovative and non-
innovative firms.  We therefore also construct a propensity-score matched sample of only 
patenting dual and single class firms using the same selection model.  We restrict our 
patenting sample to firms that applied for at least one patent in the previous ten years. 
Examining the effects of disproportionate insider control on innovation among firms that 
have a record of innovative output could be considered more stringent than examining a 
larger but mixed sample of innovating and non-innovating firms.  
One other method occasionally used to address endogeneity concerns is to examine 
changes around dual class recapitalizations (Jordan, Kim, and Liu (2016), for example). 
This alternative is less viable for our study for several reasons. First, innovation activity 
has been shown to decline with firm age (Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004); Balasubramanian 
and Lee (2008)). Therefore, a decrease in innovation following a firm’s change from dual 
class to single class structure could simply be due to the passage of time rather than the 
removal of disproportionate insider control. In addition, the unification event is not 
exogenous, but is typically associated with other significant structural changes in the firm, 
for instance mergers, bankruptcies, and the departure of the firms’ original founders, who, 
as our results suggest, play an important role for the firm’s innovativeness. Thus, it is less 
likely that an analysis of unifications would allow for reliable interpretations in the context 
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of our study.  With these caveats, we nevertheless examine changes in innovation around 
dual class unifications for robustness and consistency with the approaches in other studies.   
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
We explore the impact of disproportionate insider control on innovation activities 
and firm value within the sample of dual class firms itself as well as in a sample of dual 
class and propensity-score matched single class firms.  
Panels A and B of Table 2 provide descriptive statistics for our variable of interest, 
and our dependent and independent variables, respectively. As shown in Panel A, insiders 
possess on average 55.84% of the voting rights, but are entitled to only 29.52% of the firm’s 
cash flow rights. Insiders have on average 26.07% higher voting rights than cash flow rights, 
and the WEDGE is very similar between the full and patenting samples of dual class firms.  
We only observe minimal statistically significant differences between dual and single class 
firms with respect to any of the control variables. We note that dual class firms display 
statistically significant higher sales yet lower cash than single class firms and also are also 
more likely to be included in the S&P 500 Index. Dual and single class firms each contribute 
approximately 6.1% media and 24% technology firms to our matched sample, with no 
statistical difference, confirming the successful implementation of our matching procedure 
and elimination of differences in the industry distribution between dual and single class 
firms.  Two financial constraint proxies, the SA Index from Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and 
the HM Index from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), are lower in dual class firms yet all 
industry competition measures are similar.  Panel C presents the descriptive statistics of 
the patenting dual class firms and propensity-score matched patenting single class firms.  
Not surprisingly, patents, citations, and R&D are higher in the patenting sample compared 
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to the full sample.  However, only PATENTS/R&D is significantly higher in dual class 
firms.   
4.4 Innovation Activities and Disproportionate Control 
If disproportionate insider control enables a higher tolerance for failure of risky 
innovative projects, then we expect a positive association between WEDGE and the number 
and quality of patents. The dependent variables in our regression model are the four 
measures of innovative activities: PATENTS, CITATIONS, EXPLORATIVE, and 
EXPLOITATIVE patents.   We follow Acharya and Xu (2017) and Baranchuk, Kieschnick, 
and Moussawi (2014) and control for numerous factors that impact innovation activities, 
specifically: the state antitakeover index, the Herfindahl index, return on assets (ROA), 
capital expenditures to total assets, the log of sales, the log of firm age, the ratios of both 
cash and tangible assets to total assets, and the first difference in the log of sales as sales 
growth. Furthermore, we include industry and year fixed effects:21  
 INNO_ACTIVITY = β0 + β1WEDGEi,t + β2STATEANTI  + β3HERFINDAHLi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CAPEXi,t  + β6SALESi,t + β7AGEi,t + β8CASHi,t  +β9TANGIBLEi,t + β10SALESGROWTHi,t + β11R&Di,t  + βkYEAR + βlINDUSTRY + ε 
(2) 
Table 3 presents results of our estimation of Model (2) in the two propensity-score matched 
samples.  In Panel A we report a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
WEDGE and both PATENTS and CITATIONS in the full sample and a positive 
relationship between WEDGE and PATENTS in the patenting firm sample.  This finding 
 
21 Industry fixed effects are based on Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classifications. 
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supports H1 with respect to a positive effect of disproportionate control on innovation 
output and quality.  In addition, the dual class structure should reduce short-term market 
pressure and allow firms to focus on long-term value creation and riskier, more explorative 
innovation (March (1991)).  We distinguish between highly creative patent production and 
patents of low creativity by separately examining EXPLORATIVE patents (Fitzgerald et 
al. (2019)), where at least 80% of the prior patents cited are new to the firm representing 
the patent exploring new areas, and EXPLOITATIVE patents (He et al. (2019)) that 
include at least one self-citation and draw on a firm’s prior patent areas.  We present these 
results in Panel B.  For both the full and patenting samples, WEDGE is only positively 
related to the riskier EXPLORATIVE patents and unrelated to EXPLOITATIVE patents.  
4.5 Financial Constraints 
The long term uncertainty of innovation and the risk of not being able to maintain 
financing may lead managers to underinvest in innovative projects (Becker (1964)).  An 
initial public offering can provide financing, and Acharya and Xu (2017) find that only 
public firms in external finance dependent (EFD) industries generate more innovation than 
private firms.  However, this comes at the risk of expropriation by outsiders.  In response 
to this, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) suggest that the dual class structure allows 
innovative firms access to capital when they do not have internal resources to fund 
innovation while also retaining control.  Dual class insiders also have the advantage of being 
able to issue additional equity after the IPO with very little loss of voting control and avoid 
the concern of underinvestment.  This combined with the tolerance for failure (Manso 
(2011)) afforded by a dual class firm’s disproportionate control should allow their managers 
to pursue more valuable patents with less concern for future funding shortfalls.  Thus in 
H2A we expect disproportionate insider control to be particular beneficial for firms which 
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need to access more capital but want to maintain control of the firm’s innovation. To 
explore this conjecture, we partition our sample by the level of financial constraint using 
the WW INDEX from Whited and Wu (2006), the size and age index (SA INDEX) 
developed in Hadlock and Pierce (2010), and the text-based analysis measure (HM INDEX) 
of Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). We also split the sample by external finance dependent 
(EFD) and internal finance dependent (IFD) industries following Acharya and Xu (2017). 
In Table 4, we report results of our re-estimation of Model (2) splitting the full sample and 
patenting samples by the annual median value of each proxy into financially constrained 
and unconstrained firms, so defined. For all four measures of financial constraint and in 
both the full and patenting samples, we find that WEDGE has a positive and significant 
coefficient for the dependent variables PATENTS and CITATIONS (Panel A).  
Interestingly, in Table 4 Panel B, WEDGE has a consistent positive effect on 
EXPLORATIVE patents in the patenting subgroup in the higher financial constraint 
subsample only similar to the unpartitioned results in Table 3.  However, WEDGE is also 
related to EXPLOITATIVE patents for the high financial constraint group for the SA Index 
and the HM Index.  There are no consistent significant effects in the lower financial 
constraint subsample. The positive effects of disproportionate insider control on firm 
innovativeness are largely confined to financially constrained firms confirming H2A.  
Innovative firms facing financial constraints must access additional capital or risk 
having to cut R&D, resulting in the underinvestment problem.  We hypothesize in H2B 
that dual class firms may have an advantage in this regard in their ability to raise equity 
financing from SEO issuance without the loss of control.  In addition, even though 
innovative firms do not traditionally utilize debt financing, dual class firms may prefer to 
also increase debt financing 1) in order to assure stakeholders by providing an extra source 
of monitoring (Dey, Nikolaev, and Wang (2016)) and 2) to avoid conflicts with low voting 
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class shareholders and the loss of control (albeit minor) that results from issuing additional 
low vote shares.  As we have shown that dual class firms produce more valuable patents, 
we hypothesize in H2C that one method they may use to secure debt financing is through 
collateralized patenting.  Mann (2018) shows that 16% of U.S. patents have been pledged 
as collateral at some point.   
We take advantage of the unique financial constraint measures from Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2015) based on the firm disclosures in the capitalization and liquidity section 
of 10-K filings.  These measures, therefore, capture manager perception about liquidity 
concerns and managerial plans to access either the debt or equity markets to alleviate 
financial constraint.22  We also build the collateralized patent measure as per Mann (2018) 
by merging our main patent dataset with the Patent Assignment dataset of Marco et al. 
(2015).  We then identify patents collateralized by the firm by identifying the first contract 
execution date for a pledge of the patent as collateral.     
In Table 6, we focus on the two measures of firms with liquidity concerns that plan 
to access the equity market and firms with liquidity concerns that plan to access the debt 
market.  In Panel A, the dependent variable are those measures and in Panel B, we create 
a rank variable of these measures as our dependent variable.  We control for the WEDGE 
and all other controls from Model (2) including industry and year fixed effects.  Because 
the ability to use patents as collateral impacts debt financing, we include an indicator for 
past use of patents as collateral for loans.  Thus, COLLATERALIZED PATENTS and its 
interaction with WEDGE appear in some models.   We find that WEDGE has an 
insignificant effect on whether a constrained firm plans to access the equity market; 
 
22 Although we utilize a base measure of financial constraints in Table 5 from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) 
that simply identifies liquidity constraints, the measures used in Table 6 identify 1) whether the firm is facing 
liquidity concerns and additionally 2) whether the firm plans to issue debt or equity.  We thank Gerard 
Hoberg for providing this data on his website. 
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however, WEDGE is positively associated with both the level and rank measures of firms 
that have liquidity concerns and plan to access the debt market.  Past use of patents as 
collateral for debt increases the likelihood that constrained firms plan to access the debt 
market but not the equity market.  When we include the interaction of 
COLLATERALIZED PATENTS and WEDGE, it is only within the subset of firms with 
past collateralized patents where disproportionate insider control is associated with plans 
to access the debt market.   
Given these findings, in Table 6 Panel C, we collect debt and equity issuances from 
SDC and partition the sample by the median value of the HM Index as in Table 5.  We 
note that dual class firms have nominally higher amounts of issuances for both debt and 
equity than single class firms.  In addition, we find dual class firms are more likely to issue 
debt (significant at the 5% level) compared to single class firms in both the high and low 
financial constraint subgroups with no differences in equity issuance.  In the high financial 
constraint subgroup, debt issuances occur in 4.44% of dual class firm-years compared to 
only 1.41% of single class firm-years.   
4.6 Within Dual Class Sample Tests 
One possible concern with the reliability of results obtained from the analysis of a 
propensity-score matched sample is that results could be driven by systematic differences 
between dual and single class firms that we do not control for in our selection model. 
Analyzing the effect of disproportionate insider control on innovation within only the sample 
of dual class firms ensures that unobserved differences between dual and single class firms 
do not drive our results. Therefore, we re-estimate Model (2) using a sample of only dual 
class firms. Similar to Table 3, we include the full sample of dual class firms and the subset 
of patenting dual class firms. To control for sample selection bias, we also include the inverse 
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Mills ratio derived from our estimation of Model (1) for each sample. Results are reported 
in Table 4. In Table 4 Panel A similar to the results in Table 3, we find positive coefficients 
on WEDGE for both PATENTS and CITATIONS in both samples (all significant at the 
1% level) which represent output measures of innovation. Hence, our within sample tests 
also confirm support for H1.23  
For the dual class sample, we also utilize hand collected data on the presence of the 
original founder as a top executive or as a member of the board (FOUNDER INVOLVED) 
or a family member of the founder in the same roles (FAMILY INVOLVED), as dual class 
firms are often associated with founding families. Thus in Panel B we augment the results 
of Panel A of this table with these variables as well as the interaction between these 
indicators and WEDGE. In the full sample results, the WEDGE itself has an insignificant 
impact on both PATENTS and CITATIONS in contrast to Panel A. However, in the 
presence of the original firm founder the WEDGE is positively associated both measures of 
innovation output, with both strong statistical and economic significance. The magnitude 
of the effect of the interaction term between FOUNDER and WEDGE is greater than the 
weakly negative magnitudes of WEDGE and FOUNDER INVOLVED by themselves.  In 
the sample of patenting dual class firms, the impact of the founder is less pronounced.  Both 
WEDGE and FOUNDER INVOLVED are positively associated with PATENTS and only 
the WEDGE is associated with CITATIONS.  In Panel C of Table 6, we partition the dual 
class sample by the four financial constraint measures from Table 3.  Similar to the results 
 
23 In untabulated tests, we also estimate our model separating the two components of the WEDGE and find 
a positive impact of voting rights and a negative impact from cash flow rights on the innovation measures.  
This is consistent with the overall impact of WEDGE.  The entrenchment effects stemming from voting rights 
in the hand of insiders, insulates insiders from the market for corporate control and enables a focus on long-
term value creation, whereas the incentive alignment effect of cash flow rights induces insiders to become 
more beholden to the short-term interests of outside shareholders and the capital markets with lowered 
incentives to engage in innovation that may only pay out in the long run as a consequence.  We acknowledge 
that these two effects may not always work in opposing directions.   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516869
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3183517 
32 
 
from the full sample, the positive effect of the WEDGE on all four innovation measures is 
significant only in the high financial constraint group.24 
4.7 Impact of Firm Age on Innovation Activities  
We next evaluate a possible moderating effect of time post-IPO on the association 
between WEDGE and firm innovation.  For these tests, we partition our sample by age into 
two groups: 4-10 years, and 11+ years. All analysis in the paper excludes the first two years 
after IPO, and in these subgroups, we eliminate years 0-3 from the analysis.  In only 
including patents filed at least 4 years past IPO, we further alleviate concerns that reverse 
causality fully explains our results.25  Results of this analysis are presented in Table 7. Re-
estimating Model (2) split by age groups, we find that the coefficient on WEDGE is 
positively associated with PATENTS and CITATIONS in the 4-10 year age group but not 
in 11+ year age group.  Thus, the positive effect of disproportionate insider control on firms’ 
innovation is strongest for the youngest firms, supporting H3.  
Just as firms reduce R&D spending with age (Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007)), 
firms also reduce internal production of patents as they get older.  Our findings in Table 7 
show that dual class firms promote more innovation than single class firms when they are 
young, but any significant difference disappears with age.  Although we eliminate years 0-
3 in Table 8 to avoid the effects of selection around the IPO, it might also be informative 
to examine how a dual class structure affects innovation later in its life when these firms 
reclassify back to single class.26  For further robustness, we therefore hand collect a sample 
 
24 We display on the higher financial constraint subgroup for brevity, but we find a null effect of the WEDGE 
in the low financial constraint group.   
25 We cannot fully eliminate the possibility that some selection effects around the IPO are persistent even 
after this four year lag. 
26 As we discussed previously in section 4.2, analysis of dual class share unification is difficult for several 
reasons including the natural reduction in patenting with firm age, so results must be interpreted with caution. 
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of 54 firms that reclassify to single class in our sample period and analyze changes in 
patenting around the reclassification of firms from dual class to single class.  In Figure 1, 
we show a decrease in the number of PATENTS and CITATIONS after dual class firms 
recapitalized to single class.  The results are similar if we scale both measures by assets.  
Although we interpret this result with caution, these findings are consistent with Jordan, 
Kim, and Liu (2016) who find that reclassifying firms have a lower R&D intensity after the 
unification and provide further support for our overall findings.   
4.8 R&D Spending and Innovation Output 
 Our previous tests of innovation concentrated on one output measure of innovation 
in terms of patents and subsequent citations on patents to measure innovation quality.  
While output innovation measures address the shortcomings of R&D spending levels 
endogenously chosen by management (Atanassov (2013)), it is helpful for robustness to also 
consider the input measure R&D spending for our study.  In Table 8, we focus on R&D 
spending as well as the efficiency of R&D in producing patents and citations.  In Table 8 
Panel A, we show that for the full sample and patenting sample the WEDGE is not 
significantly related to R&D STOCK.27 Disproportionate insider control does not impact 
the innovation input measure of R&D spending.  However, we also examine the efficient 
use of R&D spending by scaling PATENTS and CITATIONS by R&D STOCK similar to 
Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013).  These measures capture the firm’s efficient use of R&D to 
produce the output of a patent that receives future citations.  In both the full sample and 
the patenting sample, WEDGE is positively associated with both R&D efficiency measures.   
 
27 Jordan, Kim, and Liu (2016) find that dual class firms have higher R&D spending, but Dey, Nikolaev, 
and Wang (2016) conclude the opposite.  We test alternate definitions of R&D spending similar to those in 
Jordan, Kim, and Liu (2016) and Dey, Nikolaev, and Wang (2016) and find no relationship between R&D 
spending and WEDGE in our sample period.  We also use a Dual Class indicator variable similar to Jordan, 
Kim, and Liu (2016) with an insignificant result for our time period.   
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 Table 8 Panels B and C present the results of R&D STOCK, PATENTS/R&D 
STOCK, and CITATIONS/R&D STOCK in the financial constraint and firm age 
subgroups.  For the WW Index and HM Index, WEDGE is not significantly related to the 
R&D efficiency measures.  However, partitioning by the SA Index or by EFD industries as 
well as for all three proxies for higher competition industries, WEDGE is positively 
associated with PATENTS/R&D STOCK and CITATIONS/R&D STOCK indicating that 
excess insider control and efficient use of R&D spending are related.  We also find this 
result is confined to firms 4-10 years past IPO.   
4.9 Culture of Innovation from Management Participation in Patenting 
We next explore whether the WEDGE is associated with a managerial innovative 
strategy that seeks to maximize their “private benefits of entrepreneurial control.” Prior 
literature suggests that a dual class structure might allow a manager the autonomy and 
independence needed to pursue risky innovative strategies that could enhance their own 
personal reputation. We test this idea using an extreme proxy for managerial innovative 
risk-taking, the filing of a patent directly by an executive of the firm. To be listed as an 
inventor on a patent application, an individual must have contributed an original idea for 
one or more of the patent claims. In addition, by law the firm executive must have expended 
considerable time on the patent themselves, as simply putting their name on a patent 
created by a lower-level employee could invalidate the patent in future litigation 
proceedings. Therefore, the participation of a top firm executive (CEO, Chairman, or 
President) as an inventor in a patent filing suggests a top-down firm culture where 
innovation is emphasized and demonstrated from the highest levels.  It also proxies for a 
more extreme form of managerial risk taking, as a failure of the patent would not only 
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represent a setback for the firm they control but also a failure of their own individual 
research skills.    
We utilize three different proxies reflecting the existence of a top-level culture of 
innovation: a dummy variable if any top executive, including the CEO, Chairman, or 
President, (EXEC DUMMY) is listed as an inventor on a patent filing in that year, the 
number of patents (EXEC PATENTS) filed by top executives in that year, and the number 
of adjusted citations of those patents with a top executive listed as an inventor (EXEC 
CITATIONS).  
In Table 9, we use these three dependent variables and replicate Model (2) to 
investigate the impact of the WEDGE on the culture of innovation created by executives 
actively participating in innovation as inventors. We use the patenting propensity matched 
sample to ensure we compare firms that issue patents where executives are inventors to 
firms that issue patents without executive participation. Table 9 reports results of our 
analysis for all patenting single and dual class firms. We find that WEDGE is positively 
associated with EXEC DUMMY, EXEC PATENTS, and EXEC CITATIONS. Thus, 
disproportionate insider control appears to create the conditions for executives to participate 
in the innovative process individually which supports H4. We partition the sample into 
groups according to time passed since the firm’s IPO and find that the positive effect is 
again most pronounced among firms closer to their IPO. WEDGE is positively associated 
with EXEC DUMMY, EXEC PATENTS, and EXEC CITATIONS in the 4-10 years age 
group, and we find only a marginally positive effect of WEDGE on EXEC CITATIONS in 
the 11+ age group. 
To ensure that our findings are not driven by CEO characteristics related to the 
sample of dual class firms, we control for the following CEO qualities that have been shown 
to determine innovation. First, younger CEOs have been shown to be more innovative 
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(Barker and Mueller (2002); Galasso and Simcoe (2011); Serfling (2014)) so we control for 
CEO age. Also, innovation declines with increasing CEO tenure (Galasso and Simcoe 
(2011)). Third, gender diversity among the management team has been shown in both the 
ethics and innovation literature to improve innovation and reduce its risks (Díaz-García, 
González-Moreno, and Jose Sáez-Martínez (2013); Chen, Ni, and Tong (2016)). We proxy 
for gender diversity by controlling for CEO gender. Finally, a large literature has shown 
that option based compensation promotes executive risk taking (Guay (1999)). In 
particular, recent literature has shown that even in firms with high takeover protection, a 
high proportion of option based compensation increases innovation and risk taking (Low 
(2009)). Thus, we also control for the proportion of option based compensation received by 
the CEO. Panel C of Table 9 incorporates the CEO controls for our measures of patenting 
executives.  We continue to find the WEDGE associated with both the presence of a 
patenting executive as well as TOP EXECUTIVE PATENTS in the 4-10 year age subgroup. 
4.10 Robustness Tests 
We conduct multiple robustness tests as discussed in this section.  First, our patent 
measures may not reflect the full spectrum of innovative activity if some patents are filed 
with little value or if firms choose not to patent.  In fact, companies may strategically file 
frivolous patents to prevent new entrants to their industry (Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Jaffe 
and Lerner (2006)).  On the other hand, patents expose trade secrets to competitors and 
may not be filed to protect these secrets (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000); Klasa et al. 
(2018)).28  We consider the question of frivolous patents by excluding observations with 
extreme levels of citations, originality, and generality.  Originality measures the breadth of 
 
28 If there are systematic differences in dual class companies choosing not to file patents or to file frivolous 
patents, our results may better be interpreted as identifying the impact of the WEDGE on the propensity to 
patent.   
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patent technology classes cited by the patent and generality measures the breadth of patent 
technology classes that later cite this patent.  To this end, we use three measures to exclude 
the extreme ends of types of patenting firms:  firm average citations per patent, patent 
originality, and patent generality.29  For each measure, we create percentile ranks for the 
universe of firms that issued at least one patent in that year.  In Table 10, we replicate the 
results in Table 3 after excluding either the top tercile or the bottom tercile of observations 
from the analysis (He et al. (2019)).  In columns 1 and 2, we exclude the top and bottom 
terciles of citations per patent observations to ensure that results are consistent without 
highly cited or low citation patents respectively.30  We show that WEDGE is positively 
related to both PATENTS and CITATIONS in both the full and patenting sample in all 
cases for CITATIONS in the patenting sample when low citation patents are removed.  
Similarly, when patents with high originality and generality are removed, the impact of 
WEDGE on PATENTS is robust across both samples but the positive coefficient of 
WEDGE on CITATIONS is confined to the full sample.  When low originality and 
generality observations are excluded, we find a positive impact of WEDGE on both 
PATENTS and CITATIONS in both samples.      
Next, we consider other firms with high antitakeover protection.  As established in 
section 2, dual class share structures are distinct from other antitakeover measures in that 
they accomplish takeover protection by enabling control of the firm by specific individuals. 
By contrast, poison pills, staggered boards, super majority requirements for merger 
approvals, etc. all make it more difficult, if not impossible, for any individual, or group of 
individuals, to achieve control. While all antitakeover strategies shelter firms from the 
market for corporate control, only dual class structures are associated with a dominant 
sustained role of specific insiders. Chemmanur, Gupta, and Simonyan (2018) do find that 
 
29 See Appendix A for variable definitions.   
30 We also find similar results excluding breakthrough patents defined in Singh and Fleming (2010). 
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pre-IPO innovation increases antitakeover protection at IPO as well as a positive impact of 
ATP on innovation in the two years following the IPO.   
To test empirically whether our findings are simply due to the positive effects of 
antitakeover protection in general or whether they are due to the distinct form of 
entrenchment in dual class firms (i.e., entrenchment through disproportionate insider 
control), we reconstitute our sample of single class firms to include only those with high 
antitakeover protection. In the first sample reported in Table 11, we include dual class firms 
and single class firms with a G-Index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) of ten or higher 
in a given year since this is the 75th percentile of the Index values in most years of our 
sample.31 The analyses in Table 11, therefore, compare dual class firms to those firms that 
have high levels of antitakeover protection from other mechanisms. Accordingly, any effect 
of WEDGE on innovation or firm value should not be simply due to antitakeover protection, 
which dual and single class firms in this sample both feature.  
In Panel A of Table 11, we replicate the model from Table 3 for PATENTS, 
CITATIONS, EXPLORATIVE and EXPLOITATIVE patents, PATENTS/R&D, and 
CITATIONS/R&D and find that WEDGE is significant and positive for five of the six 
innovation measures.  Similar to Table 3, this effect is not seen for the less risky 
EXPLOITATIVE patents. The results for R&D STOCK differ from our propensity-score 
matched samples with WEDGE positively associated with R&D spending, however both 
measures of R&D efficiency remain positively associated with WEDGE. In Panel B and C 
of Table 13, we partition our samples of dual class and top antitakeover single class firms 
by the same financial constraint and firm age groups. We continue to find a significant 
positive effect of WEDGE on PATENTS and CITATIONS as well as those measures scaled 
 
31 We alternatively define high antitakeover single class firms as those with an E-Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009)) of 4 or more.  We do not present these results for parsimony, but they are robust and available 
upon request.   
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by R&D in the high financial constraint and competition subsamples and in the 4-10 years 
past IPO age group.   
Our third robustness test considers competition as an alternate measure for financial 
constraints.  Several studies show that industry competition leads to higher cash holdings 
thus increasing financial constraint (Fresard (2010); Lyandres and Palazzo (2016); He and 
Wintoki (2016)).  Lyandres and Palazzo (2016) and He and Wintoki (2016) demonstrate 
this specifically within innovative industries.   So we replicate the results of Table 4 
partitioning the sample by the sample median of industry competition proxies in place of 
direct measures of financial constraints.   We utilize three measures of competition from 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010): 1) A Herfindahl type index using a fixed industry classification 
(FIC), 2) a measure of firm competitive power within an FIC industry using the square of 
the percent of market share held by the firm, and 3) a simple count of the frequency of 
competitors within an FIC industry.  In untabulated results, we find that the effect of the 
WEDGE on PATENTS and CITATIONS is confined to the high industry competition 
subsamples.   
In this paper, we studied three subgroups where the impact of disproportionate 
control on innovation were stronger:  financial constraints, industry competition, and firm 
age past IPO.  Our selection model used for the propensity-score matched samples controls 
for industry similarity between dual and single class firms as well as firm age since all 
measures are at IPO.  However, differences in financial constraints at the IPO may impact 
the decision to choose the dual class structure if constrained firms believe they will be able 
to have better access to capital markets with a dual class structure.  To control for this 
possibility in our final robustness test, we reestimate Model (1) and include the WW Index 
(Whited and Wu (2006)) in the IPO year in addition to other controls.  These results, 
shown in Table 12 Panel A indicated that financial constraints at IPO are not a significant 
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predictor of dual class share structure.32  Despite this, we reconstitute a full and patenting 
matched sample based on the selection model in Table 12 Panel A.  Table 12 Panel B shows 
that our results are robust to the inclusion of financial constraints as a determinant of dual 
class structure.  We also confirm in Panels C and D that the results for the financial 
constraint and firm age subgroups remain robust in the new matched sample.33   
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the association between disproportionate insider control 
and innovation. While many studies have provided evidence for increased agency costs and 
the extraction of private benefits of control by corporate insiders in firms characterized by 
disproportionate insider control (Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009)), we provide comprehensive 
evidence that dual class share structures also improve innovation output.  
In particular, we find that disproportionate insider control is positively associated 
with innovative output as measured by the number of patent filings and the quality of 
innovations as measured by patent citations and exploratory innovations. This effect is not 
due to higher R&D spending by dual class firms, but rather dual class firms use R&D more 
efficiently to generate innovation output.  In addition, we examine innovative managerial 
risk taking: individual patent filings by the firm’s top managers. Patenting typically requires 
numerous hours of experimentation before the invention can be filed, with significant 
reputational risk to a manager-inventor. We find that disproportionate insider control is 
associated with top managers’ innovative risk taking by increasing both the number and 
the quality of patent filings by top managers. 
 
32 We have a smaller sample size for these matched samples due to the availability of this WW Index.   
33 We show the results for the full sample in Table 12 Panels B-E.  Results for the new patenting propensity-
score matched sample are similar and available upon request.   
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However, these positive relationships of disproportionate control and firm 
innovativeness are not constant for all firms and through time. Specifically, we find that 
the benefits of disproportionate insider control for innovative output predominantly accrue 
to financially constrained firms. This finding supports the view expressed by DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1985) that dual class structures provide a useful blend of characteristics of 
private and public firms that enable innovative financially constrained private firms to 
access capital markets without giving up their private firm edge. Furthermore, innovative 
dual class firms are more likely to access the debt market to relieve financial constraints, 
particularly when they are able to use the value of their patents as collateral.   
We also only find a significant effect of disproportionate control on innovation in the 
first five years post-IPO. Improvements in innovation and firm value virtually disappear 
after the fifth year of a publicly traded firm’s life, suggesting a strong deterioration in the 
innovation and value-enhancing properties of a dual class share structure in the first few 
years after the IPO. While we primarily examine this finding at the firm level, in similar 
tests we find that this reduction also occurs for individual patent filings by top firm 
executives. These executives file more patents with better quality in the first five post-IPO 
firm years, but disproportionate control does not increase innovation activity by top 
executives beyond five years past the IPO. We also ensure that our results are robust to 
controlling for CEO characteristics shown to impact innovation and to an alternative 
measure of firm value. Finally, we find that the impact of disproportionate insider control 
on innovation remains even when comparing dual class firms and single class firms with 
high levels of antitakeover protections. This analysis indicates that disproportionate insider 
control on average is more effective to create a positive environment for innovation 
compared to the adoption of other antitakeover measures.  
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Nevertheless, our finding of diminishing positive effects of disproportionate insider 
control post-IPO support the call for “sunset provisions” to convert dual class shares to 
single class within a certain period of time post-IPO ((Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017); Cremers, 
Lauterbach, and Pajuste (2018)). Phasing out disproportionate ownership could avoid the 
predominance of value-destroying agency costs over value enhancing innovativeness as the 
firm matures. Given the ongoing debate in the investing community about the surge of dual 
class firms and the associated disappearance of shareholder democracy, these findings are 
timely and relevant.  
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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions 
 
 Disproportionate Control variables  
 Insider voting rights  Insider voting rights are measured by the proportion of all board seats controlled by 
insiders from both the number of votes per share of each class as well as from 
disproportionate board representation rights. 
 
 
 Insider cash flow rights  Insider cash flow rights are the percentage of shares held by insiders of each class 
weighted by the dividend rights per class.  
 
 
 Wedge  The difference between insider voting and cash flow rights. For single class firms, this 
variable is zero by design.  
 
 
 Innovation variables  
 Patents  Patents is the total count of patent filings in year t filed by inventors at firm u.  
 
 
 Citations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explorative Patents 
 Citations is the total forward citations in our sample period received by all patent filings 
received by firm u in year t. We adjust for the truncation bias in citations as in Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). Each patent filing raw total citation count is scaled by 
the average number of citation counts received for patents in that filing year. Each 
patent filing is also scaled by the average number of citation counts received in their 
patent technology class in that filing year. This amount is cumulated for firm u in year 
t.  
 
Defined as in Fitzgerald et al. (2019). Equals the total number of firm 𝑖𝑖’s patents granted 
in year 𝑡𝑡 that are classed as “explorative” divided by assets of firm I in year t. Patent is 
flagged as “explorative” if at least 80% of its citations are based on new knowledge (new 
cite ratio ≥ 80%). 
 
 
 Exploitative Patents  Defined as in He et al. (2019).  Equals the total number of firm 𝑖𝑖’s patents granted in 
year 𝑡𝑡 that are classed as “exploitative” divided by assets of firm I in year t. Patent is 
flagged as “exploitative” if it contains at least one self-citation (citing at least one patent 
from the same firm i.   
 
 
 R&D Stock  The sum of R&D expense in years [-2, 0] depreciated 20% for each year prior to the 
current year using the perpetual inventory method (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005); 
Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013)) 
 
 
 Originality  Defined as in Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997). Originality = 1 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  where 
sij denotes the percentage of citations made by patent i that belong to patent technology 
class j, out of ηi patent classes. We then average this measure for firm u in year t. 
 
 
 Generality  Defined as in Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997). Generality = 1 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  where 
sij denotes the percentage of citations received by patent i that belong to patent 
technology class j, out of ηi patent classes. We then average this measure for firm u in 
year t. 
 
 
 Patenting Firms 
 
 For firm u in year t a firm is defined as patenting if it has filed for any patents in the 
previous 10 years. 
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Collateralized Patents 
 
Equals 1 if any of a firm’s patent filings has been collateralized in the current or any 
prior year as per Mann (2018); zero otherwise. 
 
 Top Executive 
Patenting Dummy 
 Equals 1 if a patent was filed by any top executives (defined as CEO, Chairman, or 
President) in firm u in year t.  
 
  
Top Executive Patents 
  
A count of patents filed by any top executive in firm u in year t.  
 
 
  
Top Executive 
Citations 
  
This variable counts the number of adjusted citations by top executives in firm u in year 
t where citations are divided by the deflation factor of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2001). 
 
 
 Firm variables  
 State Antitakeover  This index is a score ranging from 0 to 6 based on the number of antitakeover measures 
adopted by the state: 1) control share acquisition statutes, 2) fair price statutes, 3) 3-
year business combination statutes, 4) 5-year business combination statutes, 5) poison 
pill endorsement statutes, and 6) constituency statutes. See also Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005) and Cremers and Sepe (2017). 
 
 
 Herfindahl  The Herfindahl index is based on SIC 3-digit firm pairwise similarity scores from firm 
10K text analysis data provided on Gerard Hoberg’s website (Hoberg and Phillips 
(2010)). The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the square of the market shares 
(based on revenue) for firms in a given industry 
 
 
 Sales  Log of sales. 
 
 
 Leverage  The ratio of debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt to assets. 
 
 
 ROA  EBITDA/Total assets 
 
 
 Capital Expenditures  Capital expenditures/Total assets 
 
 
 Advertising  Advertising expense/Sales 
 
 
 Cash  Cash/Total assets 
 
 
 Tangible Assets  Tangible assets/Total assets 
 
 
 Sales Growth  First difference of the log of sales 
 
 
 Firm Age  Log of the number of years since the firm’s IPO 
 
 
 S&P 500   Equal to 1 if the firm is an S&P 500 Index constituent in year t.  
 
 
 Media  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the media industry (SIC codes 2710–11, 
2720–21, 2730–31, 4830, 4832–33, 4840–41, 7810, 7812, and 7820). 
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 Tech  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the technology industry based on the 
classification put forth by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/c8/c8.cfm. 
 
 
 Financial Constraints  WW Index: Financial constraint index from the structural model of Whited and Wu 
(2006). 
 
SA Index: Size and age  financial constraint measure of Hadlock and Pierce (2010). 
 
HM Index: Data from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) using a text-based analysis of 10-
K statements for language regarding delaying investment. Larger values indicate higher 
financial constraint.  
 
EFD Industries: Measure of external vs. internal finance dependent industries by 
Acharya and Xu (2016). 
 
 
 Top Antitakeover  
(High G index) 
 
 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is single class and has a G index score 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) greater than 10 in firm u in year t.  
 
 
 Founder Involved 
 
 
Family Involved 
 
 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the original founder is a top executive or a member 
of the board. 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if a family member of the original founder is a top 
executive or a member of the board. 
 
 
  CEO characteristics  
 CEO Age  Log of the age of the CEO in firm u in year t. 
 
 
 CEO Tenure  Log of the number of years the current CEO has served in this role for firm u in year t. 
 
 
 Female CEO  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO was female in firm u in year t. 
 
 
 CEO Incentive  The percent of CEO long term incentive compensation calculated as 1-((Salary + 
Bonus)/Total Compensation. 
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Figure 1 
Innovation Activities around Dual Class Recapitalizations 
In our sample period of 2000-2008, 54 dual class firms recapitalized to a single class 
structure.  This figure displays the average number of patents and citations in the year 
prior to the recapitalization and the year after the recapitalization.  The recapitalization 
year is excluded.   
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Table 1 
Selection Model 
This table shows the results of the selection model from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) augmented with variables 
to control for the innovation pipeline of firms at the time of the IPO.  We implement the model in two samples.  The 
full sample of firms as well as the subset of patenting firms.  In our sample, firms are defined as patenting if they applied 
for a patent in the ten years before the sample year. The model has two variables to control for the joint determination 
of dual class structure and future innovation.  Number Patents is the number of patents that are pending at the IPO 
date (applied for but not yet granted) plus the patents that are filed within one year of the IPO date.  R&D at IPO is 
the ratio of research and development to assets at the point of the IPO. In addition, we include the variables Name, 
Media, SalesRank, ProfitRank, %Firms, %Sales, Sales/Region Sales, and State Antitakeover are defined in Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2010).  The models also include dummy variables for the IPO year and Fama and French (1997) 
industries.  Coefficients are displayed with standard errors beneath.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
    Full Sample    Patenting Sample   
Patent Pipeline at IPO Variables             
  Number Patents 0.0003 *   0.0003     
    0.0002     0.0002     
  R&D at IPO -0.1436     0.2492     
    0.1785     0.2154     
Other Dual Class Determinants             
  Name 0.2851 ***   0.4468 ***   
    0.0303     0.0578     
  Media 1.2943 ***   1.2041 ***   
    0.0684     0.1956     
  SalesRank 0.0083 ***   0.0087 ***   
    0.0005     0.0010     
  ProfitRank -0.0003     -0.0040     
    0.0004     0.0008     
  %Firms -4.6537 ***   -10.6356 ***   
    1.0652     1.9797     
  %Sales 4.4489 ***   9.6087 ***   
    0.7748     1.4329     
  Sales/RegionSales -0.0345     -0.2925 ***   
    0.0571     0.1133     
  State Antitakeover -0.0027     0.0300     
    0.0105     0.0193     
                
  IPO Year/Industry YES     YES     
                
  N 34,228     13,164     
  R2 0.1083     0.1089     
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Dual and Single Class Firms 
The descriptive statistics in this table covers all dual class and all patenting dual class firm years between 2000 and 2008.  
Panel A presents the variables related to insider board control rights and dividend rights in the dual class firms. Panels B 
and C use the propensity-score matched dual and single class firms from the full and patenting samples respectively based 
on the results of the selection models in Table 1.  Panel B includes 2,061 dual and single class firm years and Panel C 
includes 729 dual and single class firm years. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Panels B and C present seven measures 
of innovation activities as well as firm control variables.  We conduct a t-test for the differences between the mean values 
for the dual and single class firms and indicate significant differences in the final column.  ***, **, and * represent significant 
differences between the groups at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
  Panel A:  Dual Class Firms and Excess Control   
    Full Sample   Patenting Sample     
    Mean Median     Mean Median       
  Insider control rights 0.5584 0.6115     0.5208 0.5496       
  Insider cash flow rights 0.2952 0.2626     0.2570 0.2203       
  Wedge 0.2607 0.2596     0.2603 0.2596       
                      
  Panel B:  Full Sample:  Matched Dual and Single Class Firms   
    Dual Class Firms     Single Class Firms   Difference   
    Mean  Median     Mean  Median       
  Patents 2.6065 0.0000     3.3735 0.0000       
  Citations 3.2333 0.0000     4.1396 0.0000       
  R&D Stock 88.7948 0.0000     86.9553 0.0000       
  Patents/R&D 0.0843 0.0000     0.0772 0.0000       
  Citations/R&D 0.1037 0.0000     0.0814 0.0000       
  Explorative Patents 0.3687 0.0000     0.3886 0.0000       
  Exploitative Patents 0.5539 0.0000     0.7595 0.0000       
                      
  State Antitakeover  2.2476 1.0000     2.0971 1.0000       
  Sale 6.2790 6.3510     6.0566 6.0960   ***   
  Leverage 0.2673 0.2250     0.2633 0.2273       
  ROA 0.0824 0.1114     0.0714 0.1113       
  Capital Expenditures 0.0526 0.0364     0.0529 0.0369       
  Research & Development 0.1855 0.0000     0.2240 0.0000       
  Advertising 0.0200 0.0000     0.0176 0.0000       
  Cash 0.0975 0.0572     0.1105 0.0534   ***   
  Tangible Assets 0.2836 0.2228     0.2842 0.2231       
  Sales Growth 0.0668 0.0593     0.0671 0.0628       
  Firm Age 2.5935 2.6391     2.5820 2.6391       
  S&P 500 0.0461       0.0000     ***   
  Media 0.0611       0.0667         
  Tech 0.2368       0.2381         
  WW Index -0.1341 -0.2783     -0.1461 -0.2563       
  SA Index -3.5476 -3.4593     -3.4474 -3.3969   ***   
  HM Index -0.0257 -0.0372     -0.0182 -0.0264   **   
  Financial Dependence -0.3991 -0.6446     -0.6286 -0.6777       
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Table 2 (continued) 
  Panel C:  Patent Sample:  Matched Dual and Single Class Firms         
    Dual Class Firms     Single Class Firms   Difference   
    Mean  Median     Mean  Median       
  Patents 6.6873 0.0000     10.3182 0.0000       
  Citations 8.2916 0.0000     11.8343 0.0000       
  R&D Stock 245.0838 14.9774     292.3450 14.1400       
  Patents/R&D 0.1193 0.0000     0.0762 0.0000   **   
  Citations/R&D 0.1469 0.0000     0.0996 0.0000       
  Explorative Patents 0.9028 0.0000     1.2028 0.0000       
  Exploitative Patents 1.3373 0.0000     2.3175 0.0000       
                      
  State Antitakeover  2.3223 1.0000     2.0934 1.0000       
  Sale 6.3421 6.6211     6.5685 6.5529   **   
  Leverage 0.2025 0.1568     0.2171 0.1939       
  ROA 0.0539 0.1127     0.0949 0.1219   ***   
  Capital Expenditures 0.0401 0.0320     0.0462 0.0339   ***   
  Research & Development 0.4485 0.0145     0.3329 0.0134       
  Advertising 0.0216 0.0000     0.0146 0.0000   ***   
  Cash 0.1252 0.0872     0.1135 0.0659   *   
  Sales Growth 0.0593 0.0551     0.0520 0.0571       
  Firm Age 2.7654 2.8904     2.8378 2.9444   *   
  S&P 500 0.0179       0.0000     ***   
  Media 0.0289       0.0178         
  Tech 0.4325       0.4060         
  WW Index -0.1826 -0.2799     -0.2138 -0.2877       
  SA Index -3.6570 -3.5969     -3.6906 -3.6682       
  HM Index -0.0326 -0.0461     -0.0339 -0.0459       
  Financial Dependence -0.5395 -0.6999     -0.6143 -0.6779       
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Table 3 
Regression Analysis of Innovation Activities  
The analysis in this table is of the two propensity-score matched samples of dual class and single class 
firm years between 2000 and 2008 based on the selection model in Table 1.  The dependent variables are 
four measures of innovation activities:   Patents, Citations, Explorative Patents, and Exploitative Patents.  
Panel A includes Patents and Citations, and Panel B the remaining innovation measures.  In each model, 
the main variable of interest is the wedge between the insider voting and cash flow rights.  We also 
control for the number of state antitakeover statutes from Cremers and Sepe (2015), the Herfindahl index, 
ROA, capital expenditures to assets, R&D to assets, the log of sales, the log of firm age, cash to assets, 
the percent of tangible assets as well as industry (Fama and French (1997)) and year controls.  We report 
t-statistics based on White standard errors below each coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
Panel A:  Innovation Activities:  Patents and Citations 
  Full Sample   Patenting Sample 
Dependent Patents Citations   Patents Citations 
                    
Wedge 0.0038 *** 0.0040 **   0.0096 *** 0.0063   
  2.65   2.39     3.05   1.26   
State Antitakeover -0.0003 ** -0.0004 **   -0.0008 ** -0.0012 ** 
  -2.56   -2.00     -2.17   -2.06   
Herfindahl Index 0.0001   0.0001     -0.0009 * -0.0011 * 
  0.22   0.20     -1.84   -1.80   
ROA -0.0008   -0.0019     -0.0092   -0.0169   
  -0.73   -0.99     -1.27   -1.39   
Capex 0.0015   0.0041     0.0212   0.0409   
  0.46   0.73     0.99   1.06   
R&D 0.0000 * 0.0000 *   0.0000 * 0.0000 * 
  1.69   1.94     1.78   1.83   
Sales -0.0006 ** -0.0007 *   -0.0012 * -0.0017 * 
  -2.16   -1.78     -1.91   -1.78   
Age -0.0004   -0.0006     -0.0027 ** -0.0040 ** 
  -1.43   -1.28     -2.42   -2.04   
Cash 0.0091   0.0134     -0.0008   0.0029   
  1.27   1.17     -0.10   0.21   
Tangible 0.0004   0.0015     0.0037   0.0035   
  0.31   0.67     0.56   0.32   
Sales Growth 0.0008   0.0000     0.0031   0.0122   
  0.57   0.03     0.81   1.11   
                    
Industry/Year YES   YES     YES   YES   
                    
Adjusted R2 0.0383   0.0222     0.1178   0.0777   
N 4051   4051     1431   1431   
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B:  Innovation Activities:  Explorative and Exploitative Patents 
  Full Sample   Patenting Sample 
Dependent 
Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents   
Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents 
                    
Wedge 0.0011 ** 0.0012     0.0011 ** 0.0012   
  1.20   -0.57     1.00   1.10   
                    
Industry/Year YES   YES     YES   YES   
                    
Adjusted R2 0.0426   0.0183     0.0469   0.0706   
N 4051   4051     1431   1431   
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Table 4 
Innovation Activities by Financial Constraints 
In this analysis, we partition the two propensity-score matched samples by the median annual value of three financial 
constraint proxy variables.  We include the WW Index from Whited and Wu (2006), the SA Index from Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010), and the HM Index measured by the text-based measures of financial constraints from Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2014).  In addition, we partition on low and high external finance dependent (EFD) industries as defined in 
Acharya and Xu (2016) and Rajan and Zingales (1998).  We replicate the methodology of Table 3 but we display only 
the main coefficients of interest for each financial constraint measure.  Panel A includes Patents and Citations, and Panel 
B uses Explorative and Exploitative Patents.  We report t-statistics based on White standard errors below each coefficient.  
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
Panel A:  Innovation Activities:  Patents and Citations 
    Full Sample   Patenting Sample   
  Dependent  Patents Citations N   Patents Citations N   
    Lower Financial Constraints     
    WW Index     
  Wedge 0.0000   0.0001   2033   0.0008   0.0021   722   
    -0.07   0.19       0.56   1.18       
  Adjusted R2 0.1737   0.1235       0.2435   0.1030       
    SA Index     
  Wedge -0.0002   -0.0008   2151   -0.0021   -0.0103   750   
    -0.42   -0.78       -1.10   -1.35       
  Adjusted R2 0.1699   0.0548       0.1925   0.0827       
    HM Index     
  Wedge 0.0034   0.0025   1731   0.0049   -0.0101   614   
    1.55   1.09       1.08   -0.94       
  Adjusted R2 0.0846   0.0836       0.1565   0.0868       
    Low EFD     
  Wedge -0.0017   -0.0012   1923   0.0032   0.0081   491   
    -1.53   -0.66       1.37   1.54       
  Adjusted R2 0.0222   0.0187       0.1245   0.1006       
    Higher Financial Constraints     
    WW Index     
  Wedge 0.0105 *** 0.0113 *** 1978   0.0243 *** 0.0202 ** 709   
    3.34   3.25       3.43   2.02       
  Adjusted R2 0.0295   0.0150       0.1186   0.0776       
    SA Index     
  Wedge 0.0114 *** 0.0127 *** 1861   0.0276 *** 0.0272 *** 681   
    3.63   3.62       3.89   2.98       
  Adjusted R2 0.0406   0.0238       0.1262   0.0754       
    HM Index     
  Wedge 0.0052 * 0.0060   1575   0.0236 *** 0.0308 *** 565   
    1.86   1.64       3.38   3.06       
  Adjusted R2 0.0411   0.0297       0.1461   0.0820       
    High EFD     
  Wedge 0.0099 *** 0.0106 *** 2128   0.0130 *** 0.0071   940   
    3.61   3.46       2.89   1.06       
  Adjusted R2 0.0459   0.0269       0.1231   0.0843       
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516869
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3183517 
60 
 
Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B:  Innovation Activities:  Explorative and Exploitative Patents 
    Full Sample   Patenting Sample   
  Dependent  
Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents N   
Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents N   
    Lower Financial Constraints     
    WW Index     
  Wedge 0.0001   0.0001   2033   0.0004 * 0.0002   722   
    0.84   0.48       1.88   0.55       
  Adjusted R2 0.2029   0.1000       0.1973   0.0771       
    SA Index     
  Wedge 0.0000   0.0001   2151   0.0001   -0.0004   750   
    -0.07   0.76       0.47   -0.75       
  Adjusted R2 0.0633   0.0684       0.1448   0.0776       
    HM Index     
  Wedge 0.0004 * 0.0002   1731   0.0006   0.0000   614   
    1.75   0.32       0.89   0.03       
  Adjusted R2 0.0493   0.0245       0.0362   0.1523       
    Low EFD     
  Wedge 0.0001   0.0001   2033   0.0004 * 0.0002   722   
    0.84   0.48       1.88   0.55       
  Adjusted R2 0.2029   0.1000       0.1973   0.0771       
                            
    Higher Financial Constraints     
    WW Index     
  Wedge 0.0008 * 0.0018 ** 1978   0.0022 ** 0.0027   709   
    1.94   2.16       2.13   1.62       
  Adjusted R2 0.0159   0.0131       0.0254   0.0616       
    SA Index     
  Wedge 0.0010 *** 0.0017 ** 1861   0.0024 ** 0.0035 ** 681   
    2.61   1.96       2.39   2.07       
  Adjusted R2 0.0362   0.0175       0.0305   0.0550       
    HM Index     
  Wedge 0.0005   0.0010   1575   0.0024 ** 0.0032 ** 565   
    1.32   1.15       2.50   2.04       
  Adjusted R2 0.0646   0.0121       0.0529   0.0465       
    High EFD     
  Wedge 0.0008 * 0.0018 ** 1978   0.0022 ** 0.0027   709   
    1.94   2.16       2.13   1.62       
  Adjusted R2 0.0159   0.0131       0.0254   0.0616       
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Table 5 
Management Perception of Financial Constraints 
This table explores management perception of financial constraints based on firm disclosures in the capitalization and 
liquidity sections of 10-K filings (Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015)).  We focus on the impact of the wedge on two dependent 
variable measures:  firms with liquidity concerns that are attempting to access the equity market and firms with liquidity 
concerns that are attempting to access the debt market.  Panel A uses the raw levels of these variables from Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2015) whereas the dependent variable in Panel B is the percentile rank of the measure in the universe of firms 
for that year.  In some specifications, we include an indicator variable if a firm has previously used a patent as collateral 
in raising debt financing (Mann (2018)) as well as an interaction term between the wedge and the collateralized patent 
indicator.  Other control variables remain the same as in previous models including industry and year fixed effects.  We 
report t-statistics based on White standard errors below each coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively.  In Panel C, we partition the sample by the median value of the HM Index as in Table 4 
and look at the percent of dual class and single class firm years with either a debt issuance or equity issuance from SDC.  
We use a t-test to compute the significance of the difference in means between the dual and single class firms.     
  Liquidity Concerns:  Issue Equity   Liquidity Concerns:  Issue Debt 
Panel A:  Financial Constraint Measure Level       
Wedge 0.0075   0.0074   0.0040   0.0192 ** 0.0199 ** 0.0045   
  0.58   0.58   0.23   2.38   2.48   0.43   
Collateralized Patents     -0.0009   -0.0019       0.0080 ** 0.0037   
      -0.19   -0.31       2.40   0.93   
Collateralized*Wedge         0.0073           0.0328 ** 
          0.29           2.08   
                          
Adjusted R2 0.1779   0.1772   0.1766   0.1605   0.1639   0.1662   
N 1179   1179   1179   1179   1179   1179   
                          
Panel B: Financial Constraint Measure Rank        
Wedge 0.7271   0.7187   -0.3545   3.9919 ** 4.1667 ** -0.7208   
  0.36   0.36   -0.13   1.91   2.01   -0.27   
Collateralized Patents     -0.1011   -0.3977       2.1052 ** 0.7547   
      -0.13   -0.42       2.51   0.76   
Collateralized*Wedge         2.2801           10.3844 ** 
          0.58           2.57   
                          
Adjusted R2 0.1643   0.1636   0.1631   0.1839   0.1876   0.1914   
N 1179   1179   1179   1179   1179   1179   
                          
Panel C:  Issuance Behavior by High Financial Constraint 
  
Lower Financial Constraints:   
HM Index 
  Higher Financial Constraints   
HM Index 
  
  Dual Class Single Class Diff.    Dual Class Single Class Diff.    
Issue Debt 3.19%   2.90%   **   4.44%   1.46%   **   
Issue Equity 3.51%   2.58%       6.48%   4.01%       
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Table 6 
Within Dual Class Sample Analysis of Innovation Activities  
This table conducts a within sample analysis of only dual class firms to remove the concern that our 
results on the effect of wedge are driven by systematic differences between dual and single class firms 
not removed in the propensity-score matching process.  In all panels we include the inverse Mills ratio 
to control for sample selection bias.  Panel A includes the wedge and Panel B includes indicator 
variables for the original founder or founder family involvement in the firm as a top executive or board 
member as well as the interaction between these indicator variables and the wedge.  In Panel C, we 
display the results for the above median financial constraint subsample.  We report t-statistics based 
on White standard errors below each coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively.   
Panel A:  Innovation Activities in Dual Class Firms 
Dependent  
Patents Citations 
Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents 
                  
Wedge 0.0049 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0008 ** 
  3.05   3.32   2.95   2.02   
Inverse Mills -0.0004   0.0003   -0.0001 * -0.0002   
  -0.73   0.39   -1.82   -1.39   
                  
Industry/Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
                  
Adjusted R2 0.1114   0.0631   0.0464   0.0631   
N 2274   2274   2274   2274   
  
Panel B:  Founder and Family Involvement 
                  
Wedge -0.0023   0.0001   0.0001   -0.0012 * 
  -0.88   0.05   0.48   -1.73   
Founder Involved -0.0026 ** -0.0016   -0.0002 * -0.0005   
  -2.54   -1.29   -1.79   -1.62   
Founder*Wedge 0.0097 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0004   0.0023 ** 
  3.15   2.66   1.51   2.49   
Family Involved -0.0003   0.0000   0.0003 * -0.0001   
  -0.37   0.04   1.66   -0.34   
Family*Wedge 0.0055   0.0036   0.0001   0.0019 * 
  1.57   0.98   0.34   1.84   
Inverse Mills -0.0003   0.0003   0.0000   -0.0002   
  -0.47   0.43   -0.85   -1.07   
                  
Industry/Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
                  
Adjusted R2 0.1167   0.0639   0.0492   0.0708   
N 2260   2260   2260   2260   
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel C:  High Financial Constraints 
  
Patents Citations Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents 
  WW Index 
Wedge 0.0106 *** 0.0123 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0015 * 
  3.04   3.18   2.88   1.73   
                  
Adjusted R2 0.0986   0.0492   0.0244   0.0678   
N 1038   1038   1038   1038   
  SA Index 
Wedge 0.0095 *** 0.0115 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0014 * 
  3.43   3.63   2.65   1.91   
                  
Adjusted R2 0.1347   0.0951   0.0237   0.0870   
N 1049   1049   1049   1049   
  HM Index 
Wedge 0.0061 *** 0.0069 *** 0.0004   0.0013 ** 
  2.79   2.69   1.53   2.19   
                  
Adjusted R2 0.1734   0.0996   0.0390   0.0947   
N 904   904   904   904   
  High EFD 
Wedge 0.0143 *** 0.0168 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0022 ** 
  3.76   3.84   3.31   2.21   
                  
Adjusted R2 0.1239   0.0746   0.0780   0.0690   
N 1115   1115   1115   1115   
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Table 7 
Innovation Activities by Firm Age 
In this analysis, we partition the two propensity-score matched samples by the number of years past 
IPO:  4-10 years past IPO and 11+ years post IPO.  We replicate the methodology of Table 3 but we 
display only the main coefficients of interest for each age group.  Panel A includes Patents and Citations, 
and Panel B uses Explorative and Exploitative Patents.  We report t-statistics based on White standard 
errors below each coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.  
Panel A:  Innovation Activities:  Patents and Citations 
  Full Sample   Patenting Sample 
Dependent Patents Citations   Patents Citations 
                    
Firm Age 4-10 Years 
Wedge 0.0054 ** 0.0066 **   0.0325 *** 0.0381 *** 
  2.28   2.56     3.45   2.78   
                    
Adjusted R2 0.1370   0.1906     0.2779   0.1975   
N 1314   1314     360   360   
                    
Firm Age 11+ Years 
Wedge 0.0025   0.0013     0.0013   -0.0044   
  1.44   0.65     0.54   -0.73   
                    
Adjusted R2 0.0556   0.0193     0.2507   0.1035   
N 2330   2330     982   982   
                    
Panel B:  Innovation Activities:  Explorative and Exploitative Patents 
  Full Sample   Patenting Sample 
Dependent 
Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents   
Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents 
                    
Firm Age 4-10 Years 
Wedge 0.0006 * 0.0000     0.0034 ** 0.0027   
  1.69   -0.08     2.38   1.29   
                    
Adjusted R2 0.0245   0.0156     0.0845   0.1331   
N 1314   1314     360   360   
                    
Firm Age 11+ Years 
Wedge 0.0003   0.0011 **   0.0004   0.0011   
  1.64   2.00     1.19   1.45   
                    
Adjusted R2 0.0416   0.0429     0.1489   0.1618   
N 2330   2330     982   982   
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Table 8 
R&D Efficiency 
This table analyzes alternate measures of innovation including R&D stock as well as patents and citations scaled by R&D 
stock.  In Panel A, we include both the full propensity-score matched sample as well as the patenting propensity-score matched 
sample.  Panels B and C partition the full matched sample by four measures of financial constraints and years past IPO 
respectively.  For all measures, we include only the coefficient on the wedge.  However all controls remain the same as in 
previous tables.  We report t-statistics based on White standard errors below each coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
Panel A:  R&D Efficiency in Full Matched Sample and Patenting Matched Sample 
  Full Sample   Patenting Sample 
Dependent R&D Stock 
Patents/ 
R&D Stock 
Citations/ 
R&D Stock 
  R&D Stock 
Patents/ 
R&D Stock 
Citations/ 
R&D Stock 
                            
Wedge -23.3799   0.0784 * 0.1163 *   -58.9775   0.1786 *** 0.1774 * 
  -0.46   1.80   1.72     -0.35   3.42   1.84   
Adjusted R2 0.1040   0.0669   0.0427     0.1831   0.1968   0.0854   
N 4051   1450   1450     1431   974   974   
 
Panel B:  R&D Efficiency by Financial Constraints in Full Matched Sample 
  Lower Financial Constraints   Higher Financial Constraints 
  WW Index 
Wedge 132.2670   0.0878   0.1007     -121.9919   0.0600   0.1326   
  1.56   1.58   1.59     -1.38   0.99   1.42   
Adjusted R2 0.1858   0.0577   0.0668     0.0402   0.0808   0.0337   
N 2033   606   606     1978   831   831   
  SA Index 
Wedge -94.4201   0.0006   -0.0051     85.0312 ** 0.3676 *** 0.4539 *** 
  -1.21   0.02   -0.12     2.35   3.96   3.01   
Adjusted R2 0.1540   0.1555   0.1107     0.1251   0.1060   0.0644   
N 2151   745   745     1861   693   693   
  HM Index 
Wedge -62.4361   0.1257 * 0.0896     -74.9061 ** 0.0143   0.1510   
  -1.21   1.95   1.24     -1.98   0.10   0.72   
Adjusted R2 0.0506   0.0815   0.0628     0.1624   0.0499   0.0439   
  EFD 
Wedge 168.0859 ** 0.0222   0.1485     -214.7150 ** 0.0735 ** 0.0926 ** 
  2.12   0.15   0.60     -2.46   2.47   2.01   
Adjusted R2 0.1033   0.0233   0.0064     0.1045   0.1302   0.0654   
N 1731   628   628     2128   1028   1028   
              
Panel C:  R&D Efficiency by Firm Age in Full Matched Sample 
  Firm Age 4-10 Years   Firm Age 11+ Years 
Wedge -0.8801   0.3567 *** 0.5065 **   -45.7041   0.0127   0.0043   
  -0.01   3.05   2.37     -0.53   0.38   0.08   
Adjusted R2 0.1476   0.0845   0.0636     0.1242   0.1268   0.0516   
N 1314   417   417     2330   873   873   
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Table 9 
Culture of Innovation from Patenting Executives 
This table contains a regression analysis of the patenting propensity-score matched sample.   Top Executive 
Dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if any top executives (including the CEO, Chairman, or President) 
filed a patent in the given year.  Top Executive Patents is the number of patents filed by top executives in that 
year.  Top Executive Citations is the number of citations of all patents filed by top executives in the given year 
where citations are deflated using the method in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).  In Panel A, we use the full 
patenting sample, and in Panel B, the sample is partitioned by years past IPO.  In Panel C, we include CEO 
characteristics including age, tenure, an indicator for female CEOs and the percent of CEO incentive compensation.  
In each model, the main variable of interest is the wedge between the insider voting and cash flow rights.  We also 
control for the number of state antitakeover statutes, the Herfindahl index, ROA, capital expenditures to assets, 
R&D to assets, the log of sales, the log of firm age, cash to assets, the percent of tangible assets, as well as industry 
(Fama and French (1997)) and year controls.  We report t-statistics based on White standard errors below each 
coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
Dependent Variable 
Top Executive  
Dummy 
Top Executive  
Patents 
Top Executive  
Citations 
Panel A:  Patenting Sample 
              
Wedge 0.0841 *** 0.5036 *** 4.4756 *** 
  2.94  2.78  2.62  
Adjusted R2 0.0761  0.2661  0.1612  
N 1431  1431  1431  
              
Panel B:  Patenting Sample - By Age Group 
              
Firm Age 4-10 Years 
Wedge 0.1284 ** 0.8298 * 8.6767 * 
  2.15  1.88  1.68  
Adjusted R2 0.1378  0.5871  0.3804  
N 360  360  360  
              
Firm Age 11+ Years 
Wedge 0.0062  0.1236  0.7418 * 
  0.21  1.06  1.67  
Adjusted R2 0.0302  0.0989  0.0487  
N 982  982  982  
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Table 9 (continued) 
Panel C:  CEO Characteristics and Top Executive Patenting 
Dependent Variable 
Top Executive 
Dummy 
Top Executive 
Patents 
Top Executive 
Citations 
              
Firm Age 4-10 Years 
Wedge 0.3395 ** 0.7600 ** 11.2533  
  2.14  2.03  1.61  
CEO Age -0.3543 * -0.3084  -7.6013 * 
  -1.74  -0.42  -1.72  
CEO Tenure 0.0068  -0.1103  0.3260  
  0.31  -0.99  0.73  
Female CEO 0.2161 ** 0.1935  4.0023  
  2.09  0.61  1.50  
CEO Incentive 0.0874  0.2144  1.9038  
  0.98  1.01  0.69  
              
Adjusted R2 0.0834  0.1901  -0.0836  
N 151  151  151  
              
Firm Age 11+ Years 
Wedge -0.0817 ** -0.1434 * -0.3082  
  -2.04  -1.89  -0.69  
CEO Age -0.1074 * -0.1350  1.1032 * 
  -1.80  -1.26  1.68  
CEO Tenure 0.0172  0.0144  0.1244  
  1.40  0.53  0.76  
Female CEO -0.0579 * -0.0685  -0.0141  
  -1.70  -1.47  -0.08  
CEO Incentive -0.0856 ** -0.0736  -0.3287  
  -2.20  -0.84  -0.68  
              
Adjusted R2 0.0463  0.0050  0.0039  
N 638  638  638  
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Table 10 
Exclusion of Patents with Extreme Citations, Originality, and Generality 
This table replicates the analysis in Table 3 using the full propensity score matched sample and the patenting propensity score matched sample.  The 
coefficients shown are from the wedge on the dependent variables of Patents and Citations.  All other controls and methods are the same.  In each 
column we exclude observations to ensure robustness of results.  We measure the firm-year number of citations divided by patents and exclude those 
in the top tercile in the first column and those in the bottom tercile in the second column.  We also compute percentile ranks by year of firm level 
patent originality and generality and exclude firm-years in the top and bottom terciles as well.  We report t-statistics based on White standard errors 
below each coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
   
Exclude top 
citation patents 
Exclude low 
citation 
patents 
  Exclude top 
originality 
patents 
Exclude low 
originality  
patents 
  Exclude top 
generality 
patents 
 
Exclude low 
generality  patents 
Full Sample     
                              
Patents 0.0031 ** 0.0041 *** 0.0026 ** 0.0046 *** 0.0035 ** 0.0043 *** 
  2.14   2.75     2.30   2.96     2.50   3.05   
                              
Citations 0.0025 * 0.0043 **   0.0024 * 0.0046 *** 0.0032 ** 0.0049 *** 
  1.70   2.45     1.67   2.58     2.15   2.87   
N 3893   4051     3844   3834     3889   3820   
                              
Patenting Sample                             
                              
Patents 0.0105 *** 0.0099 *** 0.0076 ** 0.0115 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0118 *** 
  3.26   3.15     2.41   3.21     2.60   3.36   
                              
Citations 0.0097 *** 0.0063     0.0025   0.0075     0.0028   0.0121 ** 
  3.05   1.25     0.44   1.31     0.55   2.43   
N 1261   1431     1244   1215     1289   1210   
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Table 11 
Dual Class and Top Antitakeover Protection Single Class Firms 
In this table, we reconstitute the sample to include all dual class firms and single class firms with high levels of antitakeover 
protection.  The single class firms are those with a G Index (Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2003)) above 10.  The dependent 
variables include: Patents, Citations, Explorative Patents, Exploitative Patents, Patents/R&D, and Citations/R&D.  Panel 
A reports the full sample.  Panels B displays the results from the above median financial constraint subgroup. Lastly, 
Panel C considers firm years 4-10 years past IPO and 11+ years past IPO separately.  We report t-statistics based on 
White standard errors below each coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.   
Panel A:  Innovation Activities - All Dual and Top Antitakeover Single Class Firms 
Dependent  
Patents Citations 
Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents 
Patents/ 
R&D Stock 
Citations/ 
R&D Stock 
                          
Wedge 0.0030 ** 0.0030 ** 0.0004 ** 0.0004   0.0922 *** 0.0996 ** 
  2.50   2.33   2.46   1.33   2.92   2.09   
             
Panel B:  High Financial Constraints 
  WW Index 
Wedge 0.0086 *** 0.0089 *** 0.0008 ** 0.0012   0.0739 * 0.0880   
  2.76   2.63   2.12   1.57   1.79   1.43   
  SA Index 
Wedge 0.0110 *** 0.0125 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0017 ** 0.4108 *** 0.5009 *** 
  3.71   3.71   2.65   2.15   3.65   2.99   
  HM Index 
Wedge 0.0066 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0007 ** 0.0013 ** 0.1422 ** 0.2563   
  3.20   3.54   2.54   2.10   2.03   1.64   
  High EFD 
Wedge 0.0068 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0010   0.0679 ** 0.0593 * 
  2.86   2.71   2.65   1.53   2.38   1.76   
             
Panel C:  By Firm Age 
                          
  Firm Age 4-10 Years 
Wedge 0.0055 *** 0.0052 ** 0.0005 * 0.0003   0.4464 *** 0.6198 ** 
  3.17   2.28   1.82   1.42   3.13   2.50   
  Firm Age 11+ Years 
Wedge 0.0011   0.0008   0.0002   0.0004   0.0447   0.0466   
  0.78   0.60   1.31   0.85   1.48   1.33   
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Table 12 
Controlling for Financial Constraint at IPO in Dual Class Selection 
This table shows the results of the selection model from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) augmented 
with variables to control for the innovation pipeline of firms at the time of the IPO and the WW Index 
from Whited and Wu (2006) at the time of the IPO.  In Panel A, we implement the model in two samples.  
The full sample of firms as well as the subset of patenting firms.  In our sample, firms are defined as 
patenting if they applied for a patent in the ten years before the sample year. Coefficients are displayed 
with standard errors beneath.  Panel B reports the full sample.  Panels C displays the results from the 
above median financial constraint subgroup. Lastly, Panel D considers firm years 4-10 years past IPO 
and 11+ years past IPO separately. The dependent variables include: Patents, Citations, Explorative 
Patents, Exploitative Patents, Patents/R&D, and Citations/R&D.   All control variable coefficients are 
suppressed for brevity but model specifications are the same as previous tables.  ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
    Full Sample    Patenting Sample   
Financial Constraint at IPO             
  WW Index 0.0232     -0.0273     
    0.0188     0.0426     
Patent Pipeline at IPO Variables             
  Number Patents 0.0002     0.0003     
    0.0002     0.0002     
  R&D at IPO -0.1224     0.6208 ***   
    0.2001     0.2297     
Other Dual Class Determinants             
  Name 0.3016 ***   0.5463 ***   
    0.0326     0.0623     
  Media 1.3292 ***   2.0080 ***   
    0.0769     0.2663     
  SalesRank 0.0100 ***   0.0129 ***   
    0.0006     0.0012     
  ProfitRank -0.0001     -0.0042 ***   
    0.0005     0.0009     
  %Firms -5.4070 ***   -8.8638 ***   
    1.1692     2.2039     
  %Sales 5.1183 ***   7.8110 ***   
    0.8477     1.5882     
  Sales/RegionSales 0.0673     -0.2894 **   
    0.0606     0.1256     
  State Antitakeover 0.0050     0.0490 **   
    0.0113     0.0210     
                
  IPO Year/Industry YES     YES     
                
  N 29,336     13,165     
  R2 0.1126     0.1161     
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Table 12 (continued) 
Panel B:  Innovation Activities - Controlling for Financial Constraint at IPO 
Dependent  
Patents Citations Explorative 
Patents 
Exploitative 
Patents 
Patents/ 
R&D Stock 
Citations/ 
R&D Stock 
                          
Wedge 0.0039 ** 0.0052 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006   0.1197 *** 0.1578 ** 
  2.53   3.10   2.97   1.31   2.84   2.02   
                          
Panel C:  High Financial Constraints - Controlling for Financial Constraint at IPO 
                          
  WW Index 
Wedge 0.0079 *** 0.0101 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0016 * 0.2427 *** 0.3480 ** 
  2.60   3.06   2.61   1.80   3.30   2.37   
                          
  SA Index 
Wedge 0.0067 ** 0.0092 *** 0.0010 ** 0.0013 * 0.2341 *** 0.3330 ** 
  2.39   2.98   2.42   1.66   3.29   2.28   
                          
  HM Index 
Wedge 0.0058 ** 0.0087 *** 0.0006 ** 0.0007   0.1263 ** 0.1413 * 
  2.32   2.95   2.09   0.88   2.41   1.69   
                          
  High EFD 
Wedge 0.0086 *** 0.0107 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010   0.0679 * 0.0819   
  2.85   3.25   2.92   1.27   1.95   1.41   
                          
Panel D:  By Firm Age - Controlling for Financial Constraint at IPO 
                          
  Firm Age 4-10 Years 
Wedge 0.0075 *** 0.0093 *** 0.0008 ** 0.0003   0.4189 *** 0.6301 ** 
  2.81   2.89   2.02   1.01   3.00   2.42   
                          
  Firm Age 11+ Years 
Wedge 0.0014   0.0015   0.0004 ** 0.0005   0.0200   0.0303   
  0.70   0.78   2.11   0.65   0.66   0.68   
 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516869
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3183517 
